相关论文: Lipschitz solutions to mean field games with a maj…

In this paper we establish quantitative convergence results for both open and closed-loop Nash equilibria of N-player stochastic differential games in the setting of Mean Field Games of Controls (MFGC), a class of models where interactions…

We study the convergence problem for mean field games with common noise and controlled volatility. We adopt the strategy recently put forth by Lauri\`ere and the second author, using the maximum principle to recast the convergence problem…

We show the convergence of finite state symmetric N-player differential games, where players control their transition rates from state to state, to a limiting dynamics given by a finite state Mean Field Game system made of two coupled…

This paper addresses the crucial question of solution uniqueness in stationary first-order Mean-Field Games (MFGs). Despite well-established existence results, establishing uniqueness, particularly for weaker solutions in the sense of…

Here, we prove the existence of solutions to first-order mean-field games (MFGs) arising in optimal switching. First, we use the penalization method to construct approximate solutions. Then, we prove uniform estimates for the penalized…

In this manuscript, we propose a structural condition on non-separable Hamiltonians, which we term displacement monotonicity condition, to study second order mean field games master equations. A rate of dissipation of a bilinear form is…

This paper studies the convergence problem for mean field games with common noise. We define a suitable notion of weak mean field equilibria, which we prove captures all subsequential limit points, as $n\to\infty$, of closed-loop…

Recent techniques based on Mean Field Games (MFGs) allow the scalable analysis of multi-player games with many similar, rational agents. However, standard MFGs remain limited to homogeneous players that weakly influence each other, and…

We develop a probabilistic framework to approximate Nash equilibria in symmetric $N$-player games in the large population regime, via the analysis of associated mean field games (MFGs). The approximation is achieved through the analysis of…

We study mean field games for large non--exchangeable populations with moderate local interactions and common noise. The finite--player system is driven by two complementary interaction mechanisms : a graphon--type structure, which encodes…

In this paper we consider strong Nash equilibria, in mixed strategies, for finite games. Any strong Nash equilibrium outcome is Pareto efficient for each coalition. First, we analyze the two--player setting. Our main result, in its simplest…

Mean field games (MFGs) describe the limit, as $n$ tends to infinity, of stochastic differential games with $n$ players interacting with one another through their common empirical distribution. Under suitable smoothness assumptions that…

This work investigates continuous time stochastic differential games with a large number of players, whose costs and dynamics interact through the empirical distribution of both their states and their controls. The control processes are…

In this paper, we study two kinds of inverse problems for Mean Field Games (MFGs) with common noise. Our focus is on MFGs described by a coupled system of stochastic Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman and Fokker-Planck equations. Firstly, we establish…

We consider stochastic differential games with a large number of players, with the aim of quantifying the gap between closed-loop, open-loop and distributed equilibria. We show that, under two different semi-monotonicity conditions, the…

We study the regularity and well-posedness of the local, first-order forward-backward mean field games system, assuming a polynomially growing cost function and a Hamiltonian of quadratic growth. We consider systems and terminal data that…

This paper is concerned with the study of mean field games master equations involving an additional variable modelling common noise. We address cases in which the dynamics of this variable can depend on the state of the game, which requires…

We prove the global-in-time well-posedness for a broad class of mean field game problems, which is beyond the special linear-quadratic setting, as long as the mean field sensitivity is not too large. Through the stochastic maximum…

We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between players; formally, in the games we consider, the payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the empirical…

We introduce a simple class of mean field games with absorbing boundary over a finite time horizon. In the corresponding $N$-player games, the evolution of players' states is described by a system of weakly interacting It\^o equations with…