相关论文: Maximally Satisfying Lower Quotas in the Hospitals…

To mitigate the imbalance in the number of assignees in the Hospitals/Residents problem, Goko et al. [Goko et al., Maximally Satisfying Lower Quotas in the Hospitals/Residents Problem with Ties, Proc. STACS 2022, pp. 31:1--31:20] studied…

In the Hospitals/Residents problem, every hospital has an upper quota that limits the number of residents assigned to it. While, in some applications, each hospital also has a lower quota for the number of residents it receives. In this…

We consider the Hospitals/Residents (HR) problem in the presence of ties in hospital preferences. Among the three notions of stability, namely weak stability, strong stability, and super-stability, we focus on the notion of strong…

In the Hospital Residents problem with lower and upper quotas ($HR-Q^U_L$), the goal is to find a stable matching of residents to hospitals where the number of residents matched to a hospital is either between its lower and upper quota or…

The classical Hospitals/Residents problem (HR) models the assignment of junior doctors to hospitals based on their preferences over one another. In an instance of this problem, a stable matching M is sought which ensures that no blocking…

In this paper, we consider the Hospital Residents problem (HR) and the Hospital Residents problem with Lower Quotas (HRLQ). In this model with two sided preferences, stability is a well accepted notion of optimality. However, in the…

The Hospital Residents setting models important problems like school choice, assignment of undergraduate students to degree programs, among many others. In this setting, fixed quotas are associated with the programs that limit the number of…

The many-to-one stable matching problem provides the fundamental abstraction of several real-world matching markets such as school choice and hospital-resident allocation. The agents on both sides are often referred to as residents and…

In this paper, we study the Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples (HRC), where a solution is a stable matching or a report that none exists. We present a novel polynomial-time algorithm that can find a near-feasible stable matching…

We consider the well-studied Hospital Residents (HR) problem in the presence of lower quotas (LQ). The input instance consists of a bipartite graph $G = (\mathcal{R} \cup \mathcal{H}, E)$ where $\mathcal{R}$ and $\mathcal{H}$ denote sets of…

The stable roommates problem can admit multiple different stable matchings. We have different criteria for deciding which one is optimal, but computing those is often NP-hard. We show that the problem of finding generous or rank-maximal…

In the Hospitals/Residents (HR) problem, agents are partitioned into hospitals and residents. Each agent wishes to be matched to an agent in the other set and has a strict preference over these potential matches. A matching is stable if…

We consider the problem of matchings under two-sided preferences in the presence of maximum as well as minimum quota requirements for the agents. This setting, studied as the Hospital Residents with Lower Quotas (HRLQ) in literature, models…

The Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples (HRC) models the allocation of intending junior doctors to hospitals where couples are allowed to submit joint preference lists over pairs of (typically geographically close) hospitals. It is…

The Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples (HRC) is a generalisation of the classical Hospitals / Resident problem (HR) that is important in practical applications because it models the case where couples submit joint preference lists…

This paper focuses on two-sided matching where one side (a hospital or firm) is matched to the other side (a doctor or worker) so as to maximize a cardinal objective under general feasibility constraints. In a standard model, even though…

The Hospitals/Residents problem (HR) is a many-to-one matching problem whose solution concept is stability. It is widely used in assignment systems such as assigning medical students (residents) to hospitals. To resolve imbalance in the…

In the stable marriage and roommates problems, a set of agents is given, each of them having a strictly ordered preference list over some or all of the other agents. A matching is a set of disjoint pairs of mutually accepted agents. If any…

Consider the standard hospitals/residents problem, or the two-sided many-to-one stable matching problem, and assume that the true preference lists of both sides are complete and strict. The lists actually submitted, however, are truncated.…

We consider the problem of assigning agents to programs in the presence of two-sided preferences, commonly known as the Hospital Residents problem. In the standard setting each program has a rigid upper-quota which cannot be violated.…