相关论文: Multicast Network Design Game on a Ring

We introduce a framework for studying the effect of cooperation on the quality of outcomes in utility games. Our framework is a coalitional analog of the smoothness framework of non-cooperative games. Coalitional smoothness implies bounds…

In this paper we show that the price of stability of Shapley network design games on undirected graphs with k players is at most (k^3(k+1)/2-k^2) / (1+k^3(k+1)/2-k^2) H_k = (1 - \Theta(1/k^4)) H_k, where H_k denotes the k-th harmonic…

We study Nash equilibria and the price of anarchy in the classical model of Network Creation Games introduced by Fabrikant et al. In this model every agent (node) buys links at a prefixed price $\alpha>0$ in order to get connected to the…

We introduce a network design game where the objective of the players is to design the interconnections between the nodes of two different networks $G_1$ and $G_2$ in order to maximize certain local utility functions. In this setting, each…

According to the proportional allocation mechanism from the network optimization literature, users compete for a divisible resource -- such as bandwidth -- by submitting bids. The mechanism allocates to each user a fraction of the resource…

We study a general scenario of simultaneous contests that allocate prizes based on equal sharing: each contest awards its prize to all players who satisfy some contest-specific criterion, and the value of this prize to a winner decreases as…

Selfish Network Creation focuses on modeling real world networks from a game-theoretic point of view. One of the classic models by Fabrikant et al. [PODC'03] is the network creation game, where agents correspond to nodes in a network which…

In this paper, we extend the discussion of the price of anarchy of machine scheduling games to a multi-stage machine setting. The multi-stage setting arises naturally in manufacturing pipelines and distributed computing workflows, when each…

Two important metrics for measuring the quality of routing paths are the maximum edge congestion $C$ and maximum path length $D$. Here, we study bicriteria in routing games where each player $i$ selfishly selects a path that simultaneously…

In this paper, we consider the problem of network design on network games. We study the conditions on the adjacency matrix of the underlying network to design a game such that the Nash equilibrium coincides with the social optimum. We…

In this paper we present a new competitive packet routing model with edge priorities. We consider players that route selfishly through a network over time and try to reach their destinations as fast as possible. If the number of players who…

We address the question of whether price of stability results (existence of equilibria with low social cost) are robust to incomplete information. We show that this is the case in potential games, if the underlying algorithmic social cost…

The decisions that human beings make to allocate time has significant bearing on economic output and to the sustenance of social networks. The time allocation problem motivates our formal analysis of the resource allocation game, where…

We consider the problem of designing network cost-sharing protocols with good equilibria under uncertainty. The underlying game is a multicast game in a rooted undirected graph with nonnegative edge costs. A set of k terminal vertices or…

We study a pricing game in multi-hop relay networks where nodes price their services and route their traffic selfishly and strategically. In this game, each node (1) announces pricing functions which specify the payments it demands from its…

We consider the problem in which n items arrive to a market sequentially over time, where two agents compete to choose the best possible item. When an agent selects an item, he leaves the market and obtains a payoff given by the value of…

The price of anarchy has become a standard measure of the efficiency of equilibria in games. Most of the literature in this area has focused on establishing worst-case bounds for specific classes of games, such as routing games or more…

We study stable matching problems in networks where players are embedded in a social context, and may incorporate friendship relations or altruism into their decisions. Each player is a node in a social network and strives to form a good…

The design of distributed algorithms is central to the study of multiagent systems control. In this paper, we consider a class of combinatorial cost-minimization problems and propose a framework for designing distributed algorithms with a…

There have been great efforts in studying the cascading behavior in social networks such as the innovation diffusion, etc. Game theoretically, in a social network where individuals choose from two strategies: A (the innovation) and B (the…