相关论文: Insider and stealth trading with dynamic legal ris…

We consider a Kyle-type model where insider trading takes place among a potentially large population of liquidity traders and is subject to legal penalties. Insiders exploit the liquidity provided by the trading masses to "camouflage" their…

Kyle model in continuous time where the insider may be subject to legal penalties is considered. In equilibrium the insider internalises this legal risk by trading less aggressively. The equilibrium is characterised via the solution of a…

We consider a one-period Kyle (1985) framework where the insider can be subject to a penalty if she trades. We establish existence and uniqueness of equilibrium for virtually any penalty function when noise is uniform. In equilibrium, the…

We present a new discrete time version of Kyle's (1985) classic model of insider trading, formulated as a generalised extensive form game. The model has three kinds of traders: an insider, random noise traders, and a market maker. The…

In this paper, the Kyle model of insider trading is extended by characterizing the trading volume with long memory and allowing the noise trading volatility to follow a general stochastic process. Under this newly revised model, the…

We construct an equilibrium for the continuous time Kyle's model with stochastic liquidity, a general distribution of the fundamental price, and correlated stock and volatility dynamics. For distributions with positive support, our…

Kyle (1985) builds a pioneering and influential model, in which an insider with long-lived private information submits an optimal order in each period given the market maker's pricing rule. An inconsistency exists to some extent in the…

The continuous-time version of Kyle's (1985) model is studied, in which market makers are not fiduciaries. They have some market power which they utilize to set the price to their advantage, resulting in positive expected profits. This has…

This paper studies a Kyle-Back model with a risk-averse insider possessing exponential utility and a dynamic stochastic signal about the asset's terminal fundamental value. While the existing literature considers either risk-neutral…

In this paper, we present a multi-period trading model in the style of Kyle (1985)'s inside trading model, by assuming that there are at least two insiders in the market with long-lived private information, under the requirement that each…

In a continuous-time Kyle setting, we prove global existence of an equilibrium when the insider faces a terminal trading constraint. We prove that our equilibrium model produces output consistent with several empirical stylized facts such…

This paper studies the equilibrium pricing of asset shares in the presence of dynamic private information. The market consists of a risk-neutral informed agent who observes the firm value, noise traders, and competitive market makers who…

We consider a market of risky financial assets whose participants are an informed trader, a representative uninformed trader, and noisy liquidity providers. We prove the existence of a market-clearing equilibrium when the insider…

We consider a stochastic game between three types of players: an inside trader, noise traders and a market maker. In a similar fashion to Kyle's model, we assume that the insider first chooses the size of her market-order and then the…

Classical Kyle-type models of informed trading typically treat noise trader demand as purely exogenous. In reality, many market participants react to price movements and news, generating feedback effects that can significantly alter market…

In this paper we study the Kyle-Back strategic insider trading equilibrium model in which the insider has an instantaneous information on an asset, assumed to follow an Ornstein-Uhlenback-type dynamics that allows possible influence by the…

This paper investigates the equilibrium interactions between trading targets and private information in a multi-period Kyle (1985) market. There are two investors who each follow dynamic trading strategies: A strategic portfolio rebalancer…

Illegal insider trading of stocks is based on releasing non-public information (e.g., new product launch, quarterly financial report, acquisition or merger plan) before the information is made public. Detecting illegal insider trading is…

In this paper we consider a class of generalized Kyle-Back strategic insider trading models in which the insider is able to use the dynamic information obtained by observing the instantaneous movement of an underlying asset that is allowed…

We study strategic interactions in a broker-mediated market in which agents learn and exploit each other's private information. A broker provides liquidity to an informed trader and to noise traders while managing inventory in a lit market.…