相关论文: How to cut a discrete cake fairly

Single minded agents have strict preferences, in which a bundle is acceptable only if it meets a certain demand. Such preferences arise naturally in scenarios such as allocating computational resources among users, where the goal is to…

We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible items among agents whose preferences include externalities. Unlike the standard fair division model, agents may derive positive or negative utility not only from items allocated…

This paper extends the classic cake-cutting problem to a situation in which the "cake" is divided among families. Each piece of cake is owned and used simultaneously by all members of the family. A typical example of such a cake is land. We…

We consider the problem of envy-free cake cutting, which is the distribution of a continuous heterogeneous resource among self interested players such that nobody prefers what somebody else receives to what they get. Existing work has…

Relying on configuration spaces and equivariant topology, we study a general "cooperative envy-free division problem". A group of players want to cut a "cake" $I=[0,1]$ and divide among themselves the pieces in an envy-free manner. Once the…

We consider the fair division problem of indivisible items. It is well-known that an envy-free allocation may not exist, and a relaxed version of envy-freeness, envy-freeness up to one item (EF1), has been widely considered. In an EF1…

In the classical cake cutting problem, a resource must be divided among agents with different utilities so that each agent believes they have received a fair share of the resource relative to the other agents. We introduce a variant of the…

We study the problem of fair division when the resources contain both divisible and indivisible goods. Classic fairness notions such as envy-freeness (EF) and envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) cannot be directly applied to the mixed goods…

A division of a cake by n people is envy free if everyone thinks they got the biggest pieces. Note that peoples tastes can differ. There is a discrete protocol for envy free division for n=3 which takes at most 5 cuts. For n=4 and beyond…

Fair division of indivisible goods is a very well-studied problem. The goal of this problem is to distribute $m$ goods to $n$ agents in a "fair" manner, where every agent has a valuation for each subset of goods. We assume general…

We consider the problem of fairly dividing a set of heterogeneous divisible resources among agents with different preferences. We focus on the setting where the resources correspond to the edges of a connected graph, every agent must be…

We study the fundamental problem of fairly allocating a multiset $\mathcal{M}$ of $t$ types of indivisible items among $d$ groups of agents, where all agents within a group have identical additive valuations. Gorantla et al. [GMV23] showed…

We study fair division of divisible goods under generalized assignment constraints. Here, each good has an agent-specific value and size, and every agent has a budget constraint that limits the total size of the goods she can receive. Since…

There is a heterogeneous resource that contains both good parts and bad parts, for example, a cake with some parts burnt, a land-estate with some parts heavily taxed, or a chore with some parts fun to do. The resource has to be divided…

Consider $n$ players having preferences over the connected pieces of a cake, identified with the interval $[0,1]$. A classical theorem, found independently by Stromquist and by Woodall in 1980, ensures that, under mild conditions, it is…

We study the computational complexity of fairly allocating a set of indivisible items under externalities. In this recently-proposed setting, in addition to the utility the agent gets from their bundle, they also receive utility from items…

We study the fair division of divisible bad resources with strategic agents who can manipulate their private information to get a better allocation. Within certain constraints, we are particularly interested in whether truthful envy-free…

We study the problem of dividing a multi-layered cake under non-overlapping constraints. This problem, recently proposed by Hosseini et al. (IJCAI, 2020), captures several natural scenarios such as the allocation of multiple facilities over…

Cake-cutting is a playful name for the fair division of a heterogeneous, divisible good among agents, a well-studied problem at the intersection of mathematics, economics, and artificial intelligence. The cake-cutting literature is rich and…

The classic cake cutting problem concerns the fair allocation of a heterogeneous resource among interested agents. In this paper, we study a public goods variant of the problem, where instead of competing with one another for the cake, the…