Chore Cutting: Envy and Truth
Abstract
We study the fair division of divisible bad resources with strategic agents who can manipulate their private information to get a better allocation. Within certain constraints, we are particularly interested in whether truthful envy-free mechanisms exist over piecewise-constant valuations. We demonstrate that no deterministic truthful envy-free mechanism can exist in the connected-piece scenario, and the same impossibility result occurs for hungry agents. We also show that no deterministic, truthful dictatorship mechanism can satisfy the envy-free criterion, and the same result remains true for non-wasteful constraints rather than dictatorship. We further address several related problems and directions.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2301.09306,
title = {Chore Cutting: Envy and Truth},
author = {Mohammad Azharuddin Sanpui},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2301.09306},
year = {2023}
}
Comments
arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:2104.07387 by other authors