计算机科学与博弈论

The Colonel Blotto game is a deeply studied theoretical model for competitive allocation environments including elections, advertising, and ecology. However, the original formulation of Colonel Blotto has had few practical implications due…

We consider a variant of the hide-and-seek game in which a seeker inspects multiple hiding locations to find multiple items hidden by a hider. Each hiding location has a maximum hiding capacity and a probability of detecting its hidden…

We present \texttt{FlipDyn-G}, a dynamic game model extending the \texttt{FlipDyn} framework to a graph-based setting, where each node represents a dynamical system. This model captures the interactions between a defender and an adversary…

In cooperative game theory, the social configurations of players are modeled by balanced collections. The Bondareva-Shapley theorem, perhaps the most fundamental theorem in cooperative game theory, characterizes the existence of solutions…

This paper studies delegation in a model of discrete choice. In the delegation problem, an uninformed principal must consult an informed agent to make a decision. Both the agent and principal have preferences over the decided-upon action…

We investigate optimal decision making under imperfect recall, that is, when an agent forgets information it once held before. An example is the absentminded driver game, as well as team games in which the members have limited communication…

We study collaborative learning systems in which the participants are competitors who will defect from the system if they lose revenue by collaborating. As such, we frame the system as a duopoly of competitive firms who are each engaged in…

We study letter grading schemes, which are routinely employed for evaluating student performance. Typically, a numerical score obtained via one or more evaluations is converted into a letter grade (e.g., A+, B-, etc.) by associating a…

This paper proposes a payoff perturbation technique for the Mirror Descent (MD) algorithm in games where the gradient of the payoff functions is monotone in the strategy profile space, potentially containing additive noise. The optimistic…

In this paper, we investigate under which conditions normal-form games are (guaranteed to be) strategically equivalent. First, we show for N-player games (N >= 3) that (A) it is NP-hard to decide whether a given strategy is a best response…

Cryptographic Self-Selection is a paradigm employed by modern Proof-of-Stake consensus protocols to select a block-proposing "leader." Algorand [Chen and Micali, 2019] proposes a canonical protocol, and Ferreira et al. [2022] establish…

We introduce the theoretical study of a Platform Equilibrium in a market with unit-demand buyers and unit-supply sellers. Each seller can join a platform and transact with any buyer or remain off-platform and transact with a subset of…

In content recommender systems such as TikTok and YouTube, the platform's recommendation algorithm shapes content producer incentives. Many platforms employ online learning, which generates intertemporal incentives, since content produced…

Batch auctions are a classical market microstructure, acclaimed for their fairness properties, and have received renewed interest in the context of blockchain-based financial systems. Constant function market makers (CFMMs) are another…

We devise a general graph-theoretic framework for studying prophet inequalities. In this framework, an agent traverses a directed acyclic graph from a starting node $s$ to a target node $t$. Each edge has a value that is sampled from a…

We consider a principal seller with $m$ heterogeneous products to sell to an additive buyer over independent items. The principal can offer an arbitrary menu of product bundles, but faces competition from smaller and more agile single-item…

We consider allocating indivisible goods with provable fairness guarantees that are satisfied regardless of which bundle of items each agent receives. Symmetrical allocations of this type are known to exist for divisible resources, such as…

Participatory budgeting refers to the practice of allocating public resources by collecting and aggregating individual preferences. Most existing studies in this field often assume an additive utility function, where each individual holds a…

Recent simultaneous works by Peng and Rubinstein [2024] and Dagan et al. [2024] have demonstrated the existence of a no-swap-regret learning algorithm that can reach $\epsilon$ average swap regret against an adversary in any extensive-form…

We analyze bribing attacks in Proof-of-Stake distributed ledgers from a game theoretic perspective. In bribing attacks, an adversary offers participants a reward in exchange for instructing them how to behave, with the goal of attacking the…