计算机科学与博弈论

Understanding human behaviour in decision problems and strategic interactions has wide-ranging applications in economics, psychology, and artificial intelligence. Game theory offers a robust foundation for this understanding, based on the…

This paper studies the fundamental limits of availability and throughput for independent and heterogeneous demands of a limited resource. Availability is the probability that the demands are below the capacity of the resource. Throughput is…

We present a number of examples and counterexamples to illustrate the results on cost-efficiency in an incomplete market obtained in [BS24]. These examples and counterexamples do not only illustrate the results obtained in [BS24], but show…

In this paper, we calculate a basic strategy for several variations of a simplified version of Blackjack. In short, for these variants the player has only the two options of hit or stand, and they may only make either decision once. Other…

Nash equilibrium is a common solution concept that captures strategic interaction in electricity market analysis. However, it requires a fundamental but impractical assumption that all market participants are fully rational, implying…

The paper studies information markets concerning single events from an epistemic social choice perspective. Within the classical Condorcet error model for collective binary decisions, we establish equivalence results between elections and…

In recent years, there has been a significant increase in attention towards designing incentive mechanisms for federated learning (FL). Tremendous existing studies attempt to design the solutions using various approaches (e.g., game theory,…

Proof-of-stake blockchain protocols have emerged as a compelling paradigm for organizing distributed ledger systems. In proof-of-stake (PoS), a subset of stakeholders participate in validating a growing ledger of transactions. For the…

Revenue-optimal auction design is a challenging problem with significant theoretical and practical implications. Sequential auction mechanisms, known for their simplicity and strong strategyproofness guarantees, are often limited by…

We consider regret minimization in repeated games with a very large number of actions. Such games are inherent in the setting of AI Safety via Debate \cite{irving2018ai}, and more generally games whose actions are language-based. Existing…

In the metric distortion problem there is a set of candidates $C$ and voters $V$ in the same metric space. The goal is to select a candidate minimizing the social cost: the sum of distances of the selected candidate from all the voters, and…

Practical mechanisms often limit agent reports to constrained formats like trades or orderings, potentially limiting the information agents can express. We propose a novel class of mechanisms that elicit agent reports in natural language…

We consider zero-sum games in which players move between adjacent states, where in each pair of adjacent states one state dominates the other. The states in our game can represent positional advantages in physical conflict such as high…

We study the multi-party randomized communication complexity of computing a fair allocation of $m$ indivisible goods to $n < m$ equally entitled agents. We first consider MMS allocations, allocations that give every agent at least her…

Usually, to apply game-theoretic methods, we must specify utilities precisely, and we run the risk that the solutions we compute are not robust to errors in this specification. Ordinal games provide an attractive alternative: they require…

In this paper, we investigate the $k$-Facility Location Problem ($k$-FLP) within the Bayesian Mechanism Design framework, in which agents' preferences are samples of a probability distributed on a line. Our primary contribution is…

Graph games lie at the algorithmic core of many automated design problems in computer science. These are games usually played between two players on a given graph, where the players keep moving a token along the edges according to…

We consider competitive facility location as a two-stage multi-agent system with two types of clients. For a given host graph with weighted clients on the vertices, first facility agents strategically select vertices for opening their…

The fair allocation of mixed goods, consisting of both divisible and indivisible goods, has been a prominent topic of study in economics and computer science. We define an allocation as fair if its utility vector minimizes a symmetric…

In this paper, we initiate the computational problem of jointly designing information and contracts. We consider three possible classes of contracts with decreasing flexibility and increasing simplicity: ambiguous contracts, menus of…