计算机科学与博弈论

Maximizing the revenue from selling two or more goods has been shown to require the use of $nonmonotonic$ mechanisms, where a higher-valuation buyer may pay less than a lower-valuation one. Here we show that the restriction to $monotonic$…

We model the role of an online platform disrupting a market with unit-demand buyers and unit-supply sellers. Each seller can transact with a subset of the buyers whom she already knows, as well as with any additional buyers to whom she is…

We study truthful mechanisms for approximating the Maximin-Share (MMS) allocation of agents with additive valuations for indivisible goods. Algorithmically, constant factor approximations exist for the problem for any number of agents. When…

Food waste and food insecurity are two closely related pressing global issues. Food rescue organizations worldwide run programs aimed at addressing the two problems. In this paper, we partner with a non-profit organization in the state of…

Markov games (MGs) and multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) are studied to model decision making in multi-agent systems. Traditionally, the objective in MG and MARL has been risk-neutral, i.e., agents are assumed to optimize a…

Aggression is a two-player game of troop placement and attack played on a map (modeled as a graph). Players take turns deploying troops on a territory (a vertex on the graph) until they run out. Once all troops are placed, players take…

In recent years, there has been a growing interest in games on graphs within the research community, fueled by their relevance in applications such as economics, politics, and epidemiology. This paper aims to comprehensively detail the…

Over the past two decades, significant strides have been made in stochastic problems such as revenue-optimal auction design and prophet inequalities, traditionally modeled with $n$ independent random variables to represent the values of $n$…

We study principal-agent problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme -- called contract -- in order to induce an agent to take a costly, unobservable action leading to favorable outcomes. We consider a…

When we use the wisdom of the crowds, we usually rank the answers according to their popularity, especially when we cannot verify the answers. However, this can be very dangerous when the majority make systematic mistakes. A fundamental…

Multi-round competitions often double or triple the points awarded in the final round, calling it a bonus, to maximize spectators' excitement. In a two-player competition with $n$ rounds, we aim to derive the optimal bonus size to maximize…

We examine two types of binary betting markets, whose primary goal is for profit (such as sports gambling) or to gain information (such as prediction markets). We articulate the interplay between belief and price-setting to analyse both…

The classical game theory models rational players and proposes Nash equilibrium (NE) as the solution. However, real-world scenarios rarely feature rational players; instead, players make inconsistent and irrational decisions. Often,…

We consider a periodical equilibrium pricing problem for multiple firms over a planning horizon of T periods. At each period, firms set their selling prices and receive stochastic demand from consumers. Firms do not know their underlying…

Many applications of RCTs involve the presence of multiple treatment administrators -- from field experiments to online advertising -- that compete for the subjects' attention. In the face of competition, estimating a causal effect becomes…

In this survey paper we present classical and recent results relating the auction design and the optimal transportation theory. In particular, we discuss in details the seminal result of Daskalakis, Deckelbaum and Tzamos \cite{DDT} about…

Recent works have studied the design of algorithms for selecting representative sortition panels. However, the most central question remains unaddressed: Do these panels reflect the entire population's opinion? We present a positive answer…

We study the iteration complexity of decentralized learning of approximate correlated equilibria in incomplete information games. On the negative side, we prove that in $\mathit{extensive}$-$\mathit{form}$ $\mathit{games}$, assuming…

We consider games played on the transtion graph of concurrent programs running under the Total Store Order (TSO) weak memory model. Games are frequently used to model the interaction between a system and its environment, in this case…

We study zero-sum differential games with state constraints and one-sided information, where the informed player (Player 1) has a categorical payoff type unknown to the uninformed player (Player 2). The goal of Player 1 is to minimize his…