计算机科学与博弈论

We study the problem of designing a two-sided market (double auction) to maximize the gains from trade (social welfare) under the constraints of (dominant-strategy) incentive compatibility and budget-balance. Our goal is to do so for an…

Apportionment is the problem of distributing $h$ indivisible seats across states in proportion to the states' populations. In the context of the US House of Representatives, this problem has a rich history and is a prime example of…

The competitive auction was first proposed by Goldberg, Hartline, and Wright. In their paper, they introduce the competitive analysis framework of online algorithm designing into the traditional revenue-maximizing auction design problem.…

We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of chores to a group of agents. The existence of envy-free up to any item (EFX) allocations is a long-standing open question for both goods and chores. We resolve this question by providing a…

We investigate the accuracy of prediction in deterministic learning dynamics of zero-sum games with random initializations, specifically focusing on observer uncertainty and its relationship to the evolution of covariances. Zero-sum games…

We study the problem of making predictions so that downstream agents who best respond to them will be guaranteed diminishing swap regret, no matter what their utility functions are. It has been known since Foster and Vohra (1997) that…

In this paper, we study of the $m$-Capacitated Facility Location Problem ($m$-CFLP) on the line from a Bayesian Mechanism Design perspective and propose a novel class of mechanisms: the \textit{Extended Ranking Mechanisms} (ERMs). We first…

In this study, we explore the robustness of cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (c-MARL) against Byzantine failures, where any agent can enact arbitrary, worst-case actions due to malfunction or adversarial attack. To address the…

We study the problem of fairly allocating a divisible resource in the form of a graph, also known as graphical cake cutting. Unlike for the canonical interval cake, a connected envy-free allocation is not guaranteed to exist for a graphical…

The enduring value of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism has been highlighted due to its adoption by Facebook ad auctions. Our research delves into its utility in the collaborative virtual goods production (CVGP) game, which finds…

In kidney exchange programs, multiple patient-donor pairs each of whom are otherwise incompatible, exchange their donors to receive compatible kidneys. The Kidney Exchange problem is typically modelled as a directed graph where every vertex…

We consider non-cooperative facility location games where both facilities and clients act strategically and heavily influence each other. This contrasts established game-theoretic facility location models with non-strategic clients that…

Causal games are probabilistic graphical models that enable causal queries to be answered in multi-agent settings. They extend causal Bayesian networks by specifying decision and utility variables to represent the agents' degrees of freedom…

We study robust Markov games (RMG) with $s$-rectangular uncertainty. We show a general equivalence between computing a robust Nash equilibrium (RNE) of a $s$-rectangular RMG and computing a Nash equilibrium (NE) of an appropriately…

We present a framework for computing approximate mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of continuous-action games. It is a modification of the traditional double oracle algorithm, extended to multiple players and continuous action spaces. Unlike…

We present the CheckMate tool for automated verification of game-theoretic security properties, with application to blockchain protocols. CheckMate applies automated reasoning techniques to determine whether a game-theoretic protocol model…

The strategic selection of resources by selfish agents is a classic research direction, with Resource Selection Games and Congestion Games as prominent examples. In these games, agents select available resources and their utility then…

We study a non-cooperative two-sided facility location game in which facilities and clients behave strategically. This is in contrast to many other facility location games in which clients simply visit their closest facility. Facility…

We study the following game. Three players start with initial capitals of $s_{1},s_{2},s_{3}$ dollars; in each round player $P_{m}$ is selected with probability $\frac{1}{3}$; then \emph{he} selects player $P_{n}$ and they play a game in…

We study the fundamental problem of fairly dividing a set of indivisible items among agents with (general) monotone valuations. The notion of envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) is considered to be one of the most fascinating fairness…