相关论文: Multiscale Control of Stackelberg Games

This paper considers linear quadratic (LQ) mean field games with a major player and analyzes an asymptotic solvability problem. It starts with a large-scale system of coupled dynamic programming equations and applies a re-scaling technique…

We study a continuous-time stochastic Stackelberg game in which a leader seeks to accomplish a primary objective while inferring a hidden parameter of a rational follower. The follower solves an entropy-regularized tracking problem and…

Mean-field games have been studied under the assumption of very large number of players. For such large systems, the basic idea consists to approximate large games by a stylized game model with a continuum of players. The approach has been…

We provide a thorough study of a general class of linear-quadratic extended mean field games and control problems in any dimensions where the mean field terms are allowed to be unbounded and there are also presence of cross terms in the…

In this paper, we study the $extended$ mean field control problem, which is a class of McKean-Vlasov stochastic control problem where the state dynamics and the reward functions depend upon the joint (conditional) distribution of the…

This paper investigates the non-zero-sum linear-quadratic stochastic Stackelberg differential games with affine constraints, which depend on both the follower's response and the leader's strategy. With the help of the stochastic Riccati…

In this paper, we first prove that the mean-field stochastic linear quadratic (MFSLQ for short) control problem with random coefficients has a unique optimal control and derive a preliminary stochastic maximum principle to characterize this…

Mean Field Games (MFG) have been introduced to tackle games with a large number of competing players. Considering the limit when the number of players is infinite, Nash equilibria are studied by considering the interaction of a typical…

We study a Stackelberg variant of the classical discrete-time Dynkin game, in which Player 1 (the leader) commits to a stopping strategy first and Player 2 (the follower) responds optimally. This leader-follower structure induces an optimal…

In this paper, we consider mean-field games where the interaction of each player with the mean-field takes into account not only the states of the players but also their collective behavior, To do so, we develop a random variable framework…

We consider a class of linear-quadratic-Gaussian mean-field games with a major agent and considerable heterogeneous minor agents in the presence of mean-field interactions. The individual admissible controls are constrained in closed convex…

We propose a simple and original approach for solving linear-quadratic mean-field stochastic control problems. We study both finite-horizon and infinite-horizon problems, and allow notably some coefficients to be stochastic. Our method is…

Mean-field game theory relies on approximating games that are intractable to model due to a very large to infinite population of players. While these kinds of games can be solved analytically via the associated system of partial…

This paper considers a linear-quadratic (LQ) mean field control problem involving a major player and a large number of minor players, where the dynamics and costs depend on random parameters. The objective is to optimize a social cost as a…

In this paper, we investigate a class of mean field games where the mean field interactions are achieved through the joint (conditional) distribution of the controlled state and the control process. The strategies are of $open\;loop$ type,…

Mean field games are limit models for symmetric $N$-player games with interaction of mean field type as $N\to\infty$. The limit relation is often understood in the sense that a solution of a mean field game allows to construct approximate…

Establishing the existence of Nash equilibria for partially observed stochastic dynamic games is known to be quite challenging, with the difficulties stemming from the noisy nature of the measurements available to individual players…

This paper investigates an indefinite linear-quadratic partially observed mean-field game with common noise, incorporating both state-average and control-average effects. In our model, each agent's state is observed through both individual…

Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept that describes optimal strategies to commit: Player 1 (the leader) first commits to a strategy that is publicly announced, then Player 2 (the follower) plays a best response to the leader's…

In this paper, we are concerned with the stabilizatbility of Stackelberg game-based systems. In particular, two players are involved in the system where one is the follower to minimize the related cost function and the other is the leader…