相关论文: Multiscale Control of Stackelberg Games
This paper is concerned with the closed-loop Stackelberg strategy for linear-quadratic leader-follower game. Completely different from the open-loop and feedback Stackelberg strategy, the solvability of the closed-loop solution even the…
We propose a two-layer, semi-decentralized algorithm to compute a local solution to the Stackelberg equilibrium problem in aggregative games with coupling constraints. Specifically, we focus on a single-leader, multiple-follower problem,…
In this paper, we study a class of linear-quadratic (LQ) mean-field games in which the individual control process is constrained in a closed convex subset $\Gamma$ of full space $\mathbb{R}^m$. The decentralized strategies and consistency…
The Stackelberg game model, where a leader commits to a strategy and the follower best responds, has found widespread application, particularly to security problems. In the security setting, the goal is for the leader to compute an optimal…
We discuss an open-loop backward Stackelberg differential game involving single leader and single follower. Unlike most Stackelberg game literature, the state to be controlled is characterized by a backward stochastic differential equation…
A Stackelberg game is played between a leader and a follower. The leader first chooses an action, then the follower plays his best response. The goal of the leader is to pick the action that will maximize his payoff given the follower's…
This work considers stochastic differential games with a large number of players, whose costs and dynamics interact through the empirical distribution of both their states and their controls. We develop a new framework to prove convergence…
We study a multi-player one-round game termed Stackelberg Network Pricing Game, in which a leader can set prices for a subset of $m$ priceable edges in a graph. The other edges have a fixed cost. Based on the leader's decision one or more…
We study the mean field game problem for a nervous system consisting of a large number of neurons with mean-field interaction. In this system, each neuron can modulate its spiking activity by controlling its membrane potential to…
Mean field games are studied in the framework of controlled martingale problems, and general existence theorems are proven in which the equilibrium control is Markovian. The framework is flexible enough to include degenerate volatility,…
In this paper, we consider a discrete-time stochastic Stackelberg game with a single leader and multiple followers. Both the followers and the leader together have conditionally independent private types, conditioned on action and previous…
We extend the formalism of Conjectural Variations games to Stackelberg games involving multiple leaders and a single follower. To solve these nonconvex games, a common assumption is that the leaders compute their strategies having perfect…
This paper studies a linear-quadratic mean-field game of stochastic large-population system, where the large-population system satisfies a class of $N$ weakly coupled linear backward stochastic differential equation. Different from the…
We study the asymptotic organization among many optimizing individuals interacting in a suitable "moderate" way. We justify this limiting game by proving that its solution provides approximate Nash equilibria for large but finite player…
In this paper, we introduce the third party to achieve the Stackelberg equilibrium with the time inconsistency in three different Stackelberg games, which are the discrete-time games, the dynamic games, and the mean field games. Here all…
Mean field games are concerned with the limit of large-population stochastic differential games where the agents interact through their empirical distribution. In the classical setting, the number of players is large but fixed throughout…
This paper studies multi-user communication systems with two groups of users: leaders which possess system information, and followers which have no system information using the formulation of Stackelberg games. In such games, the leaders…
This paper obtains the maximum principle for both stochastic (global) open-loop and stochastic (global) closed-loop Stackelberg differential games. For the closed-loop case, we use the theory of controlled forward-backward stochastic…
The multi-leader--multi-follower game (MLMFG) involves two or more leaders and followers and serves as a generalization of the Stackelberg game and the single-leader--multi-follower game (SLMFG). Although MLMFG covers wide range of…
We study Stackelberg equilibria in finitely repeated games, where the leader commits to a strategy that picks actions in each round and can be adaptive to the history of play (i.e. they commit to an algorithm). In particular, we study…