相关论文: Sensitivity of Wardrop Equilibria: Revisited

We investigate the behavior of a large number of selfish users that are able to switch dynamically between multiple wireless access-points (possibly belonging to different standards) by introducing an iterated non-cooperative game. Users…

The Generalized Second Price auction is the primary method by which sponsered search advertisements are sold. We study the performance of this auction under various equilibrium concepts. In particular, we demonstrate that the Bayesian Price…

An epidemic spreading in a network calls for a decision on the part of the network members: They should decide whether to protect themselves or not. Their decision depends on the trade-off between their perceived risk of being infected and…

When traffic is routed through a network that is susceptible to congestion, the self-interested decisions made by individual users do not, in general, produce the optimal flow. This discrepancy is quantified by the so-called "price of…

If each node of an idealized network has an equal capacity to efficiently exchange benefits, then the network's capacity to use energy is scaled by the average amount of energy required to connect any two of its nodes. The scaling factor…

A central goal in algorithmic game theory is to analyze the performance of decentralized multiagent systems, like communication and information networks. In the absence of a central planner who can enforce how these systems are utilized,…

We investigate activities that have different periods of duration. We define the profit intensity as a measure of this economic category. The profit intensity in a repeated trading has a unique property of attaining its maximum at a fixed…

We present a new class of vertex cover and set cover games. The price of anarchy bounds match the best known constant factor approximation guarantees for the centralized optimization problems for linear and also for submodular costs -- in…

We study the allocation of divisible goods to competing agents via a market mechanism, focusing on agents with Leontief utilities. The majority of the economics and mechanism design literature has focused on \emph{linear} prices, meaning…

The price of anarchy and price of stability are three well-studied performance metrics that seek to characterize the inefficiency of equilibria in distributed systems. The distinction between these two performance metrics centers on the…

In various markets where sellers compete in price, price oscillations are observed rather than convergence to equilibrium. Such fluctuations have been empirically observed in the retail market for gasoline, in airline pricing and in the…

Competition complexity formalizes a compelling intuition: rather than refining the mechanism, how much additional competition is sufficient for a simple mechanism to compete with an optimal one? We begin the study of this question in…

This paper studies the fundamental limits of availability and throughput for independent and heterogeneous demands of a limited resource. Availability is the probability that the demands are below the capacity of the resource. Throughput is…

In potential flow networks, the equilibrium flow rates are usually not proportional to the demands and flow control elements are required to regulate the flow. The control elements can broadly be classified into two types - discrete and…

We study the Nash equilibrium and the price of anarchy in the max-distance network creation game. Network creation game, first introduced and studied by Fabrikant et al., is a classic model for real-world networks from a game-theoretic…

We study the efficiency of simple auctions in the presence of complements. [DMSW15] introduced the single-bid auction, and showed that it has a price of anarchy (PoA) of $O(\log m)$ for complement-free (i.e., subadditive) valuations. Prior…

We study a heterogeneous routing game in which vehicles might belong to more than one type. The type determines the cost of traveling along an edge as a function of the flow of various types of vehicles over that edge. We relax the…

In this paper we analyze the resilience of a network of banks to joint price fluctuations of the external assets in which they have shared exposures, and evaluate the worst-case effects of the possible default contagion. Indeed, when the…

The robustness of multiagent systems can be affected by mistakes or behavioral biases (e.g., risk-aversion, altruism, toll-sensitivity), with some agents playing the "wrong game." This can change the set of equilibria, and may in turn harm…

Different populations of vehicles travel along a network. Each population has its origin, destination and travel costs - which may well be unbounded. Under the only requirement of the continuity of the travel costs, we prove the existence…