相关论文: Sensitivity of Wardrop Equilibria: Revisited

This paper proposes a bilevel transit network design problem considering supply side uncertainty. The upper level problem determines frequency settings to simultaneously maximize the efficiency and equity measures, which are defined by the…

In Demand Response programs, price incentives might not be sufficient to modify residential consumers load profile. Here, we consider that each consumer has a preferred profile and a discomfort cost when deviating from it. Consumers can…

We study approximation algorithms for graph pricing with vertex capacities yet without the traditional envy-free constraint. Specifically, we have a set of items $V$ and a set of customers $X$ where each customer $i \in X$ has a budget…

Traffic is a significant source of global carbon emissions. In this paper, we study how carbon pricing can be used to guide traffic towards equilibria that respect given emission budgets. In particular, we consider a general multi-commodity…

We consider goods that can be shared with k-hop neighbors (i.e., the set of nodes within k hops from an owner) on a social network. We examine incentives to buy such a good by devising game-theoretic models where each node decides whether…

Organizations consist of individuals connected by their responsibilities, incentives, and reporting structure. These connections are aptly represented by a network, hierarchical or other, which is often used to divide tasks. A primary goal…

Consider networks on $n$ vertices at average density 1 per unit area. We seek a network that minimizes total length subject to some constraint on journey times, averaged over source-destination pairs. Suppose journey times depend on both…

An economy-wide production network, manifested through monetary input-output coefficients, inherently destabilizes during the general equilibrium propagation of sectoral productivity shocks when substitution elasticities are non-neutral.…

We study optimal monopoly pricing over consumer networks governed by general nonlinear utilities. In our framework, a consumer's utility is jointly determined by an individualized price and the consumption choices of their peers, propagated…

We design a simple ascending-price algorithm to compute a $(1+\varepsilon)$-approximate equilibrium in Arrow-Debreu exchange markets with weak gross substitute (WGS) property, which runs in time polynomial in market parameters and $\log…

We consider a game where a finite number of retailers choose a location, given that their potential consumers are distributed on a network. Retailers do not compete on price but only on location, therefore each consumer shops at the closest…

In multiagent systems, the complex interaction of fixed incentives can lead agents to outcomes that are poor (inefficient) not only for the group, but also for each individual. Price of anarchy is a technical, game-theoretic definition that…

We consider the fair division of indivisible items among $n$ agents with additive non-negative normalized valuations, with the goal of obtaining high value guarantees, that is, close to the proportional share for each agent. We prove that…

European Monetary Union continues to be characterised by significant macroeconomic imbalances. Germany has shown increasing current account surpluses at the expense of the other member states (especially the European periphery). Since the…

Trades based on bilateral (indivisible) contracts can be represented by a network. Vertices correspond to agents while arcs represent the non-price elements of a bilateral contract. Given prices for each arc, agents choose the incident arcs…

When network users are satisficing decision-makers, the resulting traffic pattern attains a satisficing user equilibrium, which may deviate from the (perfectly rational) user equilibrium. In a satisficing user equilibrium traffic pattern,…

Price of anarchy quantifies the degradation of social welfare in games due to the lack of a centralized authority that can enforce the optimal outcome. At its antipodes, mechanism design studies how to ameliorate these effects by…

We study bottleneck routing games where the social cost is determined by the worst congestion on any edge in the network. Bottleneck games have been studied in the literature by having the player's utility costs to be determined by the…

Cooperative equilibria are fragile. When agents learn alongside each other rather than in a fixed environment, the process of learning destabilizes the cooperation they are trying to sustain: every gradient step an agent takes shifts the…

We study network connection games where the nodes of a network perform edge swaps in order to improve their communication costs. For the model proposed by Alon et al. (2010), in which the selfish cost of a node is the sum of all shortest…