相关论文: To Observe or Not to Observe: Queuing Game Framewo…

Consider an M/M/1-type queue where joining attains a known reward, but a known waiting cost is paid per time unit spent queueing. In the 1960s, Naor showed that any arrival optimally joins the queue if its length is less than a known…

Suppose customers need to choose when to arrive to a congested queue with some desired service at the end, provided by a single server that operates only during a certain time interval. We study a model where the customers incur not only…

Today's queueing network systems are more rapidly evolving and more complex than those of even a few years ago. The goal of this paper is to study customers' behavior in an unobservable Markovian M/M/1 queue where consumers have to choose…

We introduce an atomic congestion game with two types of agents, cars and trucks, to model the traffic flow on a road over various time intervals of the day. Cars maximize their utility by finding a trade-off between the time they choose to…

Our paper approaches the parking assistance service in urban environments as an instance of service provision in non-cooperative network environments. We propose normative abstractions for the way drivers pursue parking space and the way…

We consider a model of priced resource sharing that combines both queueing behavior and strategic behavior. We study a priority service model where a single server allocates its capacity to agents in proportion to their payment to the…

This paper investigates a partially observable queueing system with $N$ nodes in which each node has a dedicated arrival stream. There is an extra arrival stream to balance the load of the system by routing its customers to the shortest…

In this paper, we study a routing and travel-mode choice problem for mobility systems with a multimodal transportation network as a ``mobility game" with coupled action sets. We develop a game-theoretic framework to study the impact on…

We analyse a non-cooperative strategic game among two ride-hailing platforms, each of which is modeled as a two-sided queueing system, where drivers (with a certain patience level) are assumed to arrive according to a Poisson process at a…

The airport game is a classical and well-known model of fair cost-sharing for a single facility among multiple agents. This paper extends it to the so-called assignment setting, that is, for multiple facilities and agents, each agent…

We analyse a non-cooperative game between two competing ride-hailing platforms, each of which is modeled as a two-sided queueing system, where drivers (with a limited level of patience) are assumed to arrive according to a Poisson process…

Consider a population of customers each of which needs to decide independently when to arrive to a facility that provides a service during a fixed period of time, say a day. This is a common scenario in many service systems such as a bank,…

With the increasing availability of transaction data collected by digital parking meters, paid curbside parking can be advantageously modeled as a network of interdependent queues. In this article we introduce methods for analyzing a…

A supermarket game is considered with $N$ FCFS queues with unit exponential service rate and global Poisson arrival rate $N \lambda$. Upon arrival each customer chooses a number of queues to be sampled uniformly at random and joins the…

How should cities invest to improve social welfare when individuals respond strategically to local conditions? We model this question using a game-theoretic version of Schelling's bounded neighbourhood model, where agents choose…

Motivated by the impact of emerging technologies on toll parks, this paper studies a problem of equilibrium, social welfare, and revenue for an infinite-server queue. More specifically, we assume that a customer's utility consists of a…

This study investigates an adaptive pricing scheme aimed at achieving an efficient state in a traffic congestion game characterized by a diverse population of road users. While the planner possesses knowledge of players' preferences, their…

Growing EV adoption can worsen traffic conditions if chargers are sited without regard to their impact on congestion. We study how to strategically place EV chargers to reduce congestion using two equilibrium models: one based on congestion…

When a centrally operated ride-hailing company considers to enter a market already served by another company, it has to make a strategic decision about how to distribute its fleet among different regions in the area. This decision will be…

Consider a distribution of citizens in an urban area in which some services (supermarkets, post offices...) are present. Each citizen, in order to use a service, spends an amount of time which is due both to the travel time to the service…