相关论文: An Algorithmic Framework for Strategic Fair Divisi…

Cutting a cake is a metaphor for the problem of dividing a resource (cake) among several agents. The problem becomes non-trivial when the agents have different valuations for different parts of the cake (i.e. one agent may like chocolate…

The classical cake cutting problem studies how to find fair allocations of a heterogeneous and divisible resource among multiple agents. Two of the most commonly studied fairness concepts in cake cutting are proportionality and…

We introduce a graphical framework for fair division in cake cutting, where comparisons between agents are limited by an underlying network structure. We generalize the classical fairness notions of envy-freeness and proportionality to this…

The classic cake-cutting problem provides a model for addressing fair and efficient allocation of a divisible, heterogeneous resource (metaphorically, the cake) among agents with distinct preferences. Focusing on a standard formulation of…

We study the fair division problem on divisible heterogeneous resources (the cake cutting problem) with strategic agents, where each agent can manipulate his/her private valuation in order to receive a better allocation. A…

The cake-cutting problem involves dividing a heterogeneous, divisible resource fairly between $n$ agents. Br\^{a}nzei et al. [6] introduced {\em generalised cut and choose} (GCC) protocols, a formal model for representing cake-cutting…

We consider the classical cake-cutting problem where we wish to fairly divide a heterogeneous resource, often modeled as a cake, among interested agents. Work on the subject typically assumes that the cake is represented by an interval. In…

We study the fair allocation of a cake, which serves as a metaphor for a divisible resource, under the requirement that each agent should receive a contiguous piece of the cake. While it is known that no finite envy-free algorithm exists in…

We study the problem of fairly allocating a divisible resource, also known as cake cutting, with an additional requirement that the shares that different agents receive should be sufficiently separated from one another. This captures, for…

Cake cutting is a classic fair division problem, with the cake serving as a metaphor for a heterogeneous divisible resource. Recently, it was shown that for any number of players with arbitrary preferences over a cake, it is possible to…

The problem of fair division known as "cake cutting" has been the focus of multiple papers spanning several decades. The most prominent problem in this line of work has been to bound the query complexity of computing an envy-free outcome in…

An unceasing problem of our prevailing society is the fair division of goods. The problem of proportional cake cutting focuses on dividing a heterogeneous and divisible resource, the cake, among $n$ players who value pieces according to…

The paper considers fair allocation of resources that are already allocated in an unfair way. This setting requires a careful balance between the fairness considerations and the rights of the present owners. The paper presents re-division…

The classic cake cutting problem concerns the fair allocation of a heterogeneous resource among interested agents. In this paper, we study a public goods variant of the problem, where instead of competing with one another for the cake, the…

We study the problem of allocating divisible resources among $n$ agents, hopefully in a fair and efficient manner. With the presence of strategic agents, additional incentive guarantees are also necessary, and the problem of designing fair…

In the classical cake cutting problem, a resource must be divided among agents with different utilities so that each agent believes they have received a fair share of the resource relative to the other agents. We introduce a variant of the…

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to groups of agents. Agents in the same group share the same set of goods even though they may have different preferences. Previous work has focused on unanimous fairness, in which…

In this article we study a cake cutting problem. More precisely, we study symmetric fair division algorithms, that is to say we study algorithms where the order of the players do not influence the value obtained by each player. In the first…

We consider the classic problem of fairly dividing a heterogeneous good ("cake") among several agents with different valuations. Classic cake-cutting procedures either allocate each agent a collection of disconnected pieces, or assume that…

Single minded agents have strict preferences, in which a bundle is acceptable only if it meets a certain demand. Such preferences arise naturally in scenarios such as allocating computational resources among users, where the goal is to…