相关论文: Competitive Equilibria in Matching Markets with Bu…

Having fixed capacities, homogeneous products and price sensitive customer purchase decision are primary distinguishing characteristics of numerous revenue management systems. Even with two or three rivals, competition is still highly…

We consider the scenario where $N$ utilities strategically bid for electricity in the day-ahead market and balance the mismatch between the committed supply and actual demand in the real-time market, with uncertainty in demand and local…

The all-pay auction, a classic competitive model, is widely applied in scenarios such as political elections, sports competitions, and research and development, where all participants pay their bids regardless of winning or losing. However,…

In this paper we consider stable matchings subject to assignment constraints. These are matchings that require certain assigned pairs to be included, insist that some other assigned pairs are not, and, importantly, are stable. Our main…

We introduce a new class of combinatorial markets in which agents have covering constraints over resources required and are interested in delay minimization. Our market model is applicable to several settings including scheduling, cloud…

We model a system of n asymmetric firms selling a homogeneous good in a common market through a pay-as-bid auction. Every producer chooses as its strategy a supply function returning the quantity S(p) that it is willing to sell at a minimum…

We consider markets consisting of a set of indivisible items, and buyers that have {\em sharp} multi-unit demand. This means that each buyer $i$ wants a specific number $d_i$ of items; a bundle of size less than $d_i$ has no value, while a…

We study the equilibria of uniform price auctions where many asymmetric bidders have flat demands up to their respective quantity constraints. We present an iterative procedure that systematically finds an equilibrium outcome as well as an…

In this work, we study a generalized Fisher market model that incorporates social influence. In this extended model, a buyer's utility depends not only on their own resource allocation but also on the allocations received by their…

The problem of allocating scarce items to individuals is an important practical question in market design. An increasingly popular set of mechanisms for this task uses the concept of market equilibrium: individuals report their preferences,…

Matching markets play a prominent role in economic theory. A prime example of such a market is the sponsored search market. Here, as in other markets of that kind, market equilibria correspond to feasible, envy free, and bidder optimal…

How does competition in markets for information affect the creation and division of surplus? We study this question in a search environment in which an agent searches sequentially for a high-quality good and learns about the quality of…

We consider a natural dynamic staffing problem in which a decision-maker sequentially hires workers over a finite horizon to meet an unknown demand revealed at the end. Predictions about demand arrive over time and become increasingly…

We introduce a model of dynamic matching with transferable utility, extending the static model of Shapley and Shubik (1971). Forward-looking agents have individual states that evolve with current matches. Each period, a matching market with…

We consider a single buyer with a combinatorial preference that would like to purchase related products and services from different vendors, where each vendor supplies exactly one product. We study the general case where subsets of products…

We study a class of procurement auctions with a budget constraint, where an auctioneer is interested in buying resources or services from a set of agents. Ideally, the auctioneer would like to select a subset of the resources so as to…

The supply function equilibrium (SFE) is a model for competition in markets where each firm offers a schedule of prices and quantities to face demand uncertainty, and has been successfully applied to wholesale electricity markets. However,…

In this paper we formulate the fixed budget resource allocation game to understand the performance of a distributed market-based resource allocation system. Multiple users decide how to distribute their budget (bids) among multiple machines…

Motivated by recent progress on pricing in the AI literature, we study marketplaces that contain multiple vendors offering identical or similar products and unit-demand buyers with different valuations on these vendors. The objective of…

We envision a marketplace where diverse entities offer specialized "modules" through APIs, allowing users to compose the outputs of these modules for complex tasks within a given budget. This paper studies the market design problem in such…