Repeated Matching Games: An Empirical Framework
Abstract
We introduce a model of dynamic matching with transferable utility, extending the static model of Shapley and Shubik (1971). Forward-looking agents have individual states that evolve with current matches. Each period, a matching market with market-clearing prices takes place. We prove the existence of an equilibrium with time-varying distributions of agent types and show it is the solution to a social planner's problem. We also prove that a stationary equilibrium exists. We introduce econometric shocks to account for unobserved heterogeneity in match formation. We propose two algorithms to compute a stationary equilibrium. We adapt both algorithms for estimation. We estimate a model of accumulation of job-specific human capital using data on Swedish engineers.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2510.02737,
title = {Repeated Matching Games: An Empirical Framework},
author = {Pauline Corblet and Jeremy Fox and Alfred Galichon},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2510.02737},
year = {2026}
}
Comments
The authors have identified potential inconsistencies in some of the proofs and wish to withdraw the paper while conducting a thorough re-evaluation