相关论文: A Stochastic Linear-Quadratic Leader-Follower Diff…

This paper introduces the new concept of (follower) satisfaction in Stackelberg games and compares the standard Stackelberg game with its satisfaction version. Simulation results are presented which suggest that the follower adopting…

We initiate the study of structured Stackelberg games, a novel form of strategic interaction between a leader and a follower where contextual information can be predictive of the follower's (unknown) type. Motivated by applications such as…

This paper investigates a linear-quadratic mean field games problem with common noise, where the drift term and diffusion term of individual state equations are coupled with both the state, control, and mean field terms of the state, and we…

This paper is concerned with a linear quadratic stochastic two-person zero-sum differential game with constant coefficients in an infinite time horizon. Open-loop and closed-loop saddle points are introduced. The existence of closed-loop…

The purpose of this paper is to establish, via a martingale approach, some refinements on the asymptotic behavior of the one-dimensional elephant random walk (ERW). The asymptotic behavior of the ERW mainly depends on a memory parameter $p$…

Building upon the eco-evolutionary game dynamics framework established by Tilman et al., we investigate stochastic fluctuations in a two-strategy system incorporating environmental feedback mechanisms, where the payoff matrix exhibits…

We consider a generalization of the so-called elephant random walk by introducing multiple elephants moving along the integer line, $\mathbb{Z}$. When taking a new step, each elephant considers not only its own previous steps but also the…

When interacting with other decision-making agents in non-adversarial scenarios, it is critical for an autonomous agent to have inferable behavior: The agent's actions must convey their intention and strategy. We model the inferability…

The paper studies the open-loop saddle point and the open-loop lower and upper values, as well as their relationship for two-person zero-sum stochastic linear-quadratic (LQ, for short) differential games with deterministic coefficients. It…

In this paper, we consider a discrete-time Stackelberg mean field game with a finite number of leaders, a finite number of major followers and an infinite number of minor followers. The leaders and the followers each observe types privately…

As predictive models are deployed into the real world, they must increasingly contend with strategic behavior. A growing body of work on strategic classification treats this problem as a Stackelberg game: the decision-maker "leads" in the…

Earlier we proposed the stochastic point process model, which reproduces a variety of self-affine time series exhibiting power spectral density S(f) scaling as power of the frequency f and derived a stochastic differential equation with the…

In this paper, we study the transmission strategy adaptation problem in an RF-powered cognitive radio network, in which hybrid secondary users are able to switch between the harvest-then-transmit mode and the ambient backscatter mode for…

This paper is concerned with an indefinite linear-quadratic mean field games of stochastic large-population system, where the individual diffusion coefficients can depend on both the state and the control of the agents. Moreover, the…

We study an online learning problem in general-sum Stackelberg games, where players act in a decentralized and strategic manner. We study two settings depending on the type of information for the follower: (1) the limited information…

A two-player finite horizon linear-quadratic Stackelberg differential game is considered. The feature of this game is that the control cost of a follower in the cost functionals of both players is small, which means that the game under…

This paper investigates a cone-constrained two-player zero-sum stochastic linear-quadratic (SLQ) differential game for stochastic differential equations (SDEs) with regime switching and random coefficients driven by a jump-diffusion…

We consider a repeated sequential game between a learner, who plays first, and an opponent who responds to the chosen action. We seek to design strategies for the learner to successfully interact with the opponent. While most previous…

This paper investigates a hybrid stochastic differential reinsurance and investment game between one reinsurer and two insurers, including a stochastic Stackelberg differential subgame and a non-zero-sum stochastic differential subgame. The…

The Stackelberg equilibrium solution concept describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (termed the leader) publicly commits to a strategy and Player 2 (termed the follower) plays a best response to this strategy (ties are broken…