相关论文: A Stochastic Linear-Quadratic Leader-Follower Diff…

Agents rarely act in isolation -- their behavioral history, in particular, is public to others. We seek a non-asymptotic understanding of how a leader agent should shape this history to its maximal advantage, knowing that follower agent(s)…

The paper is concerned with two-person zero-sum mean-field linear-quadratic stochastic differential games over finite horizons. By a Hilbert space method, a necessary condition and a sufficient condition are derived for the existence of an…

We study the problem of online learning in Stackelberg games with side information between a leader and a sequence of followers. In every round the leader observes contextual information and commits to a mixed strategy, after which the…

This paper is concerned with a Stackelberg stochastic differential game, where the systems are driven by stochastic differential equation (SDE for short), in which the control enters the randomly disturbed coefficients (drift and…

In competitive games with private objectives, actions can reveal information about hidden parameters. Quantifying such information revelation, however, is substantially more challenging, since it depends not only on the opponent's hidden…

We study the problem of online learning in a two-player decentralized cooperative Stackelberg game. In each round, the leader first takes an action, followed by the follower who takes their action after observing the leader's move. The goal…

We introduce Stackelberg Learning from Human Feedback (SLHF), a new framework for preference optimization. SLHF frames the alignment problem as a sequential-move game between two policies: a Leader, which commits to an action, and a…

This paper studies a nonlinear open-loop mean field Stackelberg stochastic differential game by using the probabilistic method through the FBSDE system and the idea of taking control as the fixed point. We successively construct the…

Recent results in the ML community have revealed that learning algorithms used to compute the optimal strategy for the leader to commit to in a Stackelberg game, are susceptible to manipulation by the follower. Such a learning algorithm…

Stackelberg games are a classic example of bilevel optimization problems, which are often encountered in game theory and economics. These are complex problems with a hierarchical structure, where one optimization task is nested within the…

In this paper, we investigate a class of nonzero-sum dynamic stochastic games, where players have linear dynamics and quadratic cost functions. The players are coupled in both dynamics and cost through a linear regression (weighted average)…

A growing body of work in game theory extends the traditional Stackelberg game to settings with one leader and multiple followers who play a Nash equilibrium. Standard approaches for computing equilibria in these games reformulate the…

We study a class of linear-quadratic mean-field games with incomplete information. For each agent, the state is given by a linear forward stochastic differential equation with common noise. Moreover, both the state and control variables can…

We extend the formalism of Conjectural Variations games to Stackelberg games involving multiple leaders and a single follower. To solve these nonconvex games, a common assumption is that the leaders compute their strategies having perfect…

We analyse large deviations of time-averaged quantities in stochastic processes with long-range memory, where the dynamics at time t depends itself on the value q_t of the time-averaged quantity. First we consider the elephant random walk…

This paper is concerned with a three-level multi-leader-follower incentive Stackelberg game with $H_\infty$ constraint. Based on $H_2/H_\infty$ control theory, we firstly obtain the worst-case disturbance and the team-optimal strategy by…

We study online learning in Bayesian Stackelberg games, where a leader repeatedly interacts with a follower whose unknown private type is independently drawn at each round from an unknown probability distribution. The goal is to design…

The multi-leader--multi-follower game (MLMFG) involves two or more leaders and followers and serves as a generalization of the Stackelberg game and the single-leader--multi-follower game (SLMFG). Although MLMFG covers wide range of…

The multilevel reverse Stackelberg game is considered. In this game, the leader controls the outcome by announcing a strategy as a function of decision variables of the followers to his/her own decision space. Corresponding to the leader's…

Spatial evolutionary games provide a valuable framework for elucidating the emergence and maintenance of cooperative behavior. However, most previous studies assume that individuals are profiteers and neglect to consider the effects of…