相关论文: A Stochastic Linear-Quadratic Leader-Follower Diff…

This paper investigates a zero-sum stochastic linear-quadratic (SLQ, for short) Stackelberg differential game problem, where the coefficients of the state equation and the weighting matrices in the performance functional are regulated by a…

In a Stackelberg game, a leader commits to a randomized strategy, and a follower chooses their best strategy in response. We consider an extension of a standard Stackelberg game, called a discrete-time dynamic Stackelberg game, that has an…

We consider a discrete-time random walk where the random increment at time step $t$ depends on the full history of the process. We calculate exactly the mean and variance of the position and discuss its dependence on the initial condition…

In this paper, a partially observed stochastic linear Stackelberg differential game with mean-variance criteria is studied. Randomness comes from Brownian motions and Poisson random measures. which leads to a circular dependency. We follow…

Motivated by a product pricing problem, a linear-quadratic Stackelberg differential game for a regime switching system involving one leader and two followers is studied. The two followers engage in a zero-sum differential game, and both the…

In this paper, we consider a sequential stochastic Stackelberg game with two players, a leader and a follower. The follower has access to the state of the system while the leader does not. Assuming that the players act in their respective…

This paper studies open-loop and feedback solutions to leader-follower mean field linear-quadratic-Gaussian games with multiplicative noise by the direct approach. The leader-follower game involves a leader and many followers, where the…

In this paper, we consider a linear quadratic stochastic two-person nonzero-sum differential game. Open-loop and closed-loop Nash equilibria are introduced. The existence of the former is characterized by the solvability of a system of…

Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept that describes optimal strategies to commit: Player 1 (the leader) first commits to a strategy that is publicly announced, then Player 2 (the follower) plays a best response to the leader's…

We consider a class of non-cooperative N-player non-zero-sum stochastic differential games with singular controls, in which each player can affect a linear stochastic differential equation in order to minimize a cost functional which is…

The paper is concerned with a zero-sum Stackelberg stochastic linear-quadratic (LQ, for short) differential game over finite horizons. Under a fairly weak condition, the Stackelberg equilibrium is explicitly obtained by first solving a…

We study a continuous-time stochastic Stackelberg game in which a leader seeks to accomplish a primary objective while inferring a hidden parameter of a rational follower. The follower solves an entropy-regularized tracking problem and…

Many real-world strategic games involve interactions between multiple players. We study a hierarchical multi-player game structure, where players with asymmetric roles can be separated into leaders and followers, a setting often referred to…

In multi-agent problems requiring a high degree of cooperation, success often depends on the ability of the agents to adapt to each other's behavior. A natural solution concept in such settings is the Stackelberg equilibrium, in which the…

Leader-follower general-sum stochastic games (LF-GSSGs) model sequential decision-making under asymmetric commitment, where a leader commits to a policy and a follower best responds, yielding a strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) with…

This paper is concerned with a kind of linear-quadratic (LQ, for short) two-person zero-sum stochastic differential game problems with partial observation. We propose the notions of explicit and implicit feedback laws under partial…

This paper studies a class of dynamic Stackelberg games under open-loop information structure with constrained linear agent dynamics and quadratic utility functions. We show two important properties for this class of dynamic Stackelberg…

This article studies linear-quadratic Stackelberg games between two dominating players (or equivalently, leaders) and a large group of followers, each of whom interacts under a mean field game (MFG) framework. Unlike the conventional…

In many settings of interest, a policy is set by one party, the leader, in order to influence the action of another party, the follower, where the follower's response is determined by some private information. A natural question to ask is,…

Elephant random walk is a special type of random walk that incorporates the memory of the past to determine its future steps. The probability of this walk taking a particular step (+1 or -1) at a time point, conditioned on the entire…