相关论文: Mean-Field Liquidation Games with Market Drop-out

We consider both $N$-player and mean-field games of optimal portfolio liquidation in which the players are not allowed to change the direction of trading. Players with an initially short position of stocks are only allowed to buy while…

We consider a mean field game (MFG) of optimal portfolio liquidation under asymmetric information. We prove that the solution to the MFG can be characterized in terms of a FBSDE with possibly singular terminal condition on the backward…

Mean-field games with absorption is a class of games, that have been introduced in Campi and Fischer (2018) and that can be viewed as natural limits of symmetric stochastic differential games with a large number of players who, interacting…

We introduce a simple class of mean field games with absorbing boundary over a finite time horizon. In the corresponding $N$-player games, the evolution of players' states is described by a system of weakly interacting It\^o equations with…

We analyze novel portfolio liquidation games with self-exciting order flow. Both the N-player game and the mean-field game are considered. We assume that players' trading activities have an impact on the dynamics of future market order…

Recent financial bubbles such as the emergence of cryptocurrencies and "meme stocks" have gained increasing attention from both retail and institutional investors. In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic model on optimal liquidation in…

We study a class of deterministic mean field games on finite and infinite time horizons arising in models of optimal exploitation of exhaustible resources. The main characteristic of our game is an absorption constraint on the players'…

We consider mean field games with discrete state spaces (called discrete mean field games in the following) and we analyze these games in continuous and discrete time, over finite as well as infinite time horizons. We prove the existence of…

We analyze linear McKean-Vlasov forward-backward SDEs arising in leader-follower games with mean-field type control and terminal state constraints on the state process. We establish an existence and uniqueness of solutions result for such…

In this paper we formulate the now classical problem of optimal liquidation (or optimal trading) inside a Mean Field Game (MFG). This is a noticeable change since usually mathematical frameworks focus on one large trader in front of a…

In this work, we study an equilibrium-based continuous asset pricing problem which seeks to form a price process endogenously by requiring it to balance the flow of sales-and-purchase orders in the exchange market, where a large number of…

We analyze the Master Equation within Mean Field Games (MFG) theory considering a bounded domain with homogeneous Dirichlet conditions. Concerning the N-players differential game, the player's dynamic ends when touching the boundary. We…

In this paper, we use mean field games (MFGs) to investigate approximations of $N$-player games with uniformly symmetrically continuous heterogeneous closed-loop actions. To incorporate agents' risk aversion (beyond the classical expected…

We consider a mean field game describing the limit of a stochastic differential game of $N$-players whose state dynamics are subject to idiosyncratic and common noise and that can be absorbed when they hit a prescribed region of the state…

Motivated by recent empirical findings on the periodic phenomenon of aggregated market volumes in equity markets, we aim to understand the causes and consequences of periodic trading activities through a game-theoretic perspective,…

We formulate a mean field game where each player stops a privately observed Brownian motion with absorption. Players are ranked according to their level of stopping and rewarded as a function of their relative rank. There is a unique mean…

We consider a general class of nonzero-sum $N$-player stochastic games with impulse controls, where players control the underlying dynamics with discrete interventions. We adopt a verification approach and provide sufficient conditions for…

In a probabilistic mean field game driven by a L\'evy process an individual player aims to minimize a long run discounted/ergodic cost by controlling the process through a pair of increasing and decreasing c\`adl\`ag processes, while he is…

We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between players; formally, in the games we consider, the payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the empirical…

Mean-field games have been studied under the assumption of very large number of players. For such large systems, the basic idea consists to approximate large games by a stylized game model with a continuum of players. The approach has been…