相关论文: Approximating Equilibrium under Constrained Piecew…

Market equilibrium is one of the most fundamental solution concepts in economics and social optimization analysis. Existing works on market equilibrium computation primarily focus on settings with relatively few buyers. Motivated by this,…

In this paper, inspired by the work of Megiddo on the formation of preferences and strategic analysis, we consider an early market model studied in the field of economic theory, in which each trader's utility may be influenced by the…

We design a simple ascending-price algorithm to compute a $(1+\varepsilon)$-approximate equilibrium in Arrow-Debreu exchange markets with weak gross substitute (WGS) property, which runs in time polynomial in market parameters and $\log…

We study Fisher markets that admit equilibria wherein each good is integrally assigned to some agent. While strong existence and computational guarantees are known for equilibria of Fisher markets with additive valuations, such equilibria,…

The Arrow-Debreu extension of the classic Hylland-Zeckhauser scheme for a one-sided matching market -- called ADHZ in this paper -- has natural applications but has instances which do not admit equilibria. By introducing approximation, we…

We introduce the notion of non-monotone utilities, which covers a wide variety of utility functions in economic theory. We then prove that it is PPAD-hard to compute an approximate Arrow-Debreu market equilibrium in markets with linear and…

We present a strongly polynomial algorithm for computing an equilibrium in Arrow-Debreu exchange markets with linear utilities. Our algorithm is based on a variant of the weakly-polynomial Duan-Mehlhorn (DM) algorithm. We use the DM…

We study decentralized markets for goods whose utility perishes in time, with compute as a primary motivation. Recent advances in reproducible and verifiable execution allow jobs to pause, verify, and resume across heterogeneous hardware,…

We present the first combinatorial polynomial time algorithm for computing the equilibrium of the Arrow-Debreu market model with linear utilities.

This paper derives polynomial-time approximation schemes for several NP-hard stochastic optimization problems from the algorithmic mechanism design and operations research literatures. The problems we consider involve a principal or seller…

In this paper, we bring consumer theory to bear in the analysis of Fisher markets whose buyers have arbitrary continuous, concave, homogeneous (CCH) utility functions representing locally non-satiated preferences. The main tools we use are…

We consider a nonlinear extension of the generalized network flow model, with the flow leaving an arc being an increasing concave function of the flow entering it, as proposed by Truemper and Shigeno. We give a polynomial time combinatorial…

The Fisher market is one of the most fundamental models for resource allocation problems in economic theory, wherein agents spend a budget of currency to buy goods that maximize their utilities, while producers sell capacity constrained…

We show that the problem of finding an \epsilon-approximate Nash equilibrium of an n by n two-person games can be reduced to the computation of an (\epsilon/n)^2-approximate market equilibrium of a Leontief economy. Together with a recent…

We consider the Arrow--Debreu exchange market model under the assumption that the agents' demands satisfy the weak gross substitutes (WGS) property. We present a simple auction algorithm that obtains an approximate market equilibrium for…

Edge computing has been recently introduced as a way to bring computational capabilities closer to end users of modern network-based services, in order to support existent and future delay-sensitive applications by effectively addressing…

This paper resolves two of the handful of remaining questions on the computability of market equilibria, a central theme within algorithmic game theory (AGT). Our results are as follows: 1. We show FIXP-hardness of computing equilibria in…

In this work, we study a generalized Fisher market model that incorporates social influence. In this extended model, a buyer's utility depends not only on their own resource allocation but also on the allocations received by their…

Classical algorithms for market equilibrium computation such as proportional response dynamics face scalability issues with Internet-based applications such as auctions, recommender systems, and fair division, despite having an almost…

We study a class of combinatorial scheduling problems characterized by a particular type of constraint often associated with electrical power or gas energy. This constraint appears in several practical applications and is expressed as a sum…