相关论文: A Linear-quadratic Mean-Field Stochastic Stackelbe…

This paper considers a linear-quadratic (LQ) mean field control problem involving a major player and a large number of minor players, where the dynamics and costs depend on random parameters. The objective is to optimize a social cost as a…

Guided cooperation allows intelligent agents with heterogeneous capabilities to work together by following a leader-follower type of interaction. However, the associated control problem becomes challenging when the leader agent does not…

Batch reinforcement learning (RL) defines the task of learning from a fixed batch of data lacking exhaustive exploration. Worst-case optimality algorithms, which calibrate a value-function model class from logged experience and perform some…

We develop a martingale approach for studying continuous-time stochastic differential games of control and stopping, in a non-Markovian framework and with the control affecting only the drift term of the state-process. Under appropriate…

In this paper, we study a class of linear-quadratic (LQ) mean-field games in which the individual control process is constrained in a closed convex subset $\Gamma$ of full space $\mathbb{R}^m$. The decentralized strategies and consistency…

An optimal control problem is studied for a linear mean-field stochastic differential equation with a quadratic cost functional. The coefficients and the weighting matrices in the cost functional are all assumed to be deterministic.…

This article is concerned with stochastic control problems for backward doubly stochastic differential equations of mean-field type, where the coefficient functions depend on the joint distribution of the state process and the control…

In this paper, we study the linear-quadratic control problem for mean-field backward stochastic differential equations (MF-BSDE) with random coefficients. We first derive a preliminary stochastic maximum principle to analyze the unique…

Dynamic Stackelberg games are a broad class of two-player games in which the leader acts first, and the follower chooses a response strategy to the leader's strategy. Unfortunately, only stylized Stackelberg games are explicitly solvable…

A linear quadratic (LQ) stochastic optimization problem with delay involving weakly-coupled large population is investigated in this paper. Different to classic mean field (MF) game, here agents cooperate with each other to minimize the…

This paper focuses on linear-quadratic (LQ for short) mean-field games described by forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs for short), in which the individual control region is postulated to be convex. The decentralized…

We discuss and compare two methods of investigations for the asymptotic regime of stochastic differential games with a finite number of players as the number of players tends to the infinity. These two methods differ in the order in which…

We present a new solution concept called evolutionarily stable Stackelberg equilibrium (SESS). We study the Stackelberg evolutionary game setting in which there is a single leading player and a symmetric population of followers. The leader…

We consider interacting agent systems with a large number of stochastic agents (or particles) influenced by a fixed number of external stochastic lead agents. Such examples arise, for example in models of opinion dynamics, where a small…

Stackelberg games originate where there are market leaders and followers, and the actions of leaders influence the behavior of the followers. Mathematical modelling of such games results in what's called a Bilevel Optimization problem.…

We consider a multi-player stochastic differential game with linear McKean-Vlasov dynamics and quadratic cost functional depending on the variance and mean of the state and control actions of the players in open-loop form. Finite and…

We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between players; formally, in the games we consider, the payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the empirical…

We study a class of linear-quadratic mean-field games with incomplete information. For each agent, the state is given by a linear forward stochastic differential equation with common noise. Moreover, both the state and control variables can…

In this paper, the two-player leader-follower game with private inputs for feedback Stackelberg strategy is considered. In particular, the follower shares its measurement information with the leader except its historical control inputs…

A two-player finite horizon linear-quadratic Stackelberg differential game is considered. The feature of this game is that the control cost of a follower in the cost functionals of both players is small, which means that the game under…