相关论文: Facets of the cone of exact games

The class of totally balanced games is a class of transferable-utility coalitional games providing important models of cooperative behavior used in mathematical economics. They coincide with market games of Shapley and Shubik and every…

We study the geometric structure of the set of cooperative transferable utility games having a nonempty core, characterized by Bondareva and Shapley as balanced games. We show that this set is a nonpointed polyhedral cone, and we find the…

We consider transferable utility cooperative games with infinitely many players and the core understood in the space of bounded additive set functions. We show that, if a game is bounded below, then its core is non-empty if and only if the…

Incomplete cooperative games generalise the classical model of cooperative games by omitting the values of some of the coalitions. This allows to incorporate uncertainty into the model and study the underlying games as well as possible…

The computation of a solution concept of a cooperative game usually depends on values of all coalitions. However, in some applications, values of some of the coalitions might be unknown due to various reasons. We introduce a method to…

The computation of a solution concept of a cooperative game usually employs values of all coalitions. However, in some applications, the values of some of the coalitions might be unknown due to high costs associated with their determination…

In this paper, we defined two new games - the mildly Menger game and the compact-clopen game. In a zero-dimensional space, the Menger game is equivalent to the mildly Menger game and the compact-open game is equivalent to the compact-clopen…

We initiate the study of simple games from the point of view of combinatorial topology. The starting premise is that the losing coalitions of a simple game can be identified with a simplicial complex. Various topological constructions and…

A solution concept on a class of transferable utility coalitional games is a multifunction satisfying given criteria of economic rationality. Every solution associates a set of payoff allocations with a coalitional game. This general…

We propose a general definition of perfect equilibrium which is applicable to a wide class of games. A key feature is the concept of completely mixed nets of strategies, based on a more detailed notion of carrier of a strategy. Under…

Equilibrium predictions in games of incomplete information are sensitive to the assumed information structure. Monderer and Samet (1996) and Kajii and Morris (1998) define topological notions of proximity for common prior information…

We propose a refinement of correlated equilibrium based on mediator errors, called correlated perfect equilibrium (CPE). In finite games, the set of CPE is nonempty and forms a finite union of convex sets. Like perfect equilibrium, a CPE…

The work we present in this paper initiated the formal study of fractional hedonic games, coalition formation games in which the utility of a player is the average value he ascribes to the members of his coalition. Among other settings,…

Traditionally social sciences are interested in structuring people in multiple groups based on their individual preferences. This pa- per suggests an approach to this problem in the framework of a non- cooperative game theory. Definition of…

Independent set games are cooperative games defined on graphs, where players are edges and the value of a coalition is the maximum cardinality of independent sets in the subgraph defined by the coalition. In this paper, we investigate the…

The main ambition of this thesis is to contribute to the development of cooperative game theory towards combinatorics, algorithmics and discrete geometry. Therefore, the first chapter of this manuscript is devoted to highlighting the…

We study the computational complexity of finding stable outcomes in hedonic games, which are a class of coalition formation games. We restrict our attention to symmetric additively-separable hedonic games, which are a nontrivial subclass of…

LP-duality theory has played a central role in the study of cores of games, right from the early days of this notion to the present time. The classic paper of Shapley and Shubik \cite{Shapley1971assignment} introduced the "right" way of…

In the usual models of cooperative game theory, the outcome of a coalition formation process is either the grand coalition or a coalition structure that consists of disjoint coalitions. However, in many domains where coalitions are…

The classic paper of Shapley and Shubik \cite{Shapley1971assignment} characterized the core of the assignment game using ideas from matching theory and LP-duality theory and their highly non-trivial interplay. Whereas the core of this game…