相关论文: Nash Bargaining Over Margin Loans to Kelly Gambler…

We study a toy two-player game for periodic double auction markets to generate liquidity. The game has imperfect information, which allows us to link market spreads with signal strength. We characterize Nash equilibria in cases with or…

One index satisfies the duality axiom if one agent, who is uniformly more risk-averse than another, accepts a gamble, the latter accepts any less risky gamble under the index. Aumann and Serrano (2008) show that only one index defined for…

In this paper, we investigate the seeking of Nash equilibrium (NE) in a non-cooperative quadratic game where all agents exchange their delayed strategy information with their neighbors. To extend best-response algorithms to the delayed…

A gambler walks into a hypothetical fair casino with a very real dollar bill, but by the time he leaves he's exchanged the dollar for a random amount of money. What is lost in the process? It may be that the gambler walks out at the end of…

Consider a market where a seller owns an item for sale and a buyer wants to purchase it. Each player has private information, known as their type. It can be costly and difficult for the players to reach an agreement through direct…

Two sellers compete to sell identical products to a single buyer. Each seller chooses an arbitrary mechanism, possibly involving lotteries, to sell their product. The utility-maximizing buyer can choose to participate in one or both…

There has been much recent work on the revenue-raising properties of truthful mechanisms for selling goods to selfish bidders. Typically the revenue of a mechanism is compared against a benchmark (such as, the maximum revenue obtainable by…

Projected gradient ascent is known to satisfy no-external regret as a learning algorithm. However, recent empirical work shows that projected gradient ascent often finds the Nash equilibrium in settings beyond two-player zero-sum…

We study a contextual version of the repeated brokerage problem. In each interaction, two traders with private valuations for an item seek to buy or sell based on the learner's-a broker-proposed price, which is informed by some contextual…

We consider a financial market in which the risk-free rate of interest is modeled as a Markov diffusion. We suppose that home prices are set by a representative home-buyer, who can afford to pay only a fixed cash-flow per unit time for…

In an incomplete semimartingale model of a financial market, we consider several risk-averse financial agents who negotiate the price of a bundle of contingent claims. Assuming that the agents' risk preferences are modelled by convex…

The use of reinforcement learning algorithms in financial trading is becoming increasingly prevalent. However, the autonomous nature of these algorithms can lead to unexpected outcomes that deviate from traditional game-theoretical…

We examine normal-form games in which players may \emph{pre-commit} to outcome-contingent transfers before choosing their actions. In the one-shot version of this model, Jackson and Wilkie showed that side contracting can backfire: even a…

We design and analyze attention games that incentivize validators to check computation results. We show that no pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the game without outside parties exists by a simple argument. We then proceed to calculate the…

In FX cash markets, market makers provide liquidity to clients for a wide variety of currency pairs. Because of flow uncertainty and market volatility, they face inventory risk. To mitigate this risk, they typically skew their prices to…

This paper considers an $N$-player stochastic Nash game in which the $i$th player minimizes a composite objective $f_i(x) + r_i(x_i)$, where $f_i$ is expectation-valued and $r_i$ has an efficient prox-evaluation. In this context, we make…

How do large-scale participants in parimutuel wagering events affect the house and ordinary bettors? A standard narrative suggests that they may temporarily benefit the former at the expense of the latter. To approach this problem, we begin…

We provide a natural learning process in which a financial trader without a risk receives a gain in case when Stock Market is inefficient. In this process, the trader rationally choose his gambles using a prediction made by a randomized…

We propose a two-layer stochastic game model to study reinsurance contracting and competition in a market with one insurer and two competing reinsurers. The insurer negotiates with both reinsurers simultaneously for proportional reinsurance…

We consider games that have (k,t)-robust equilibria when played with a mediator, where an equilibrium is (k,t)-robust if it tolerates deviations by coalitions of size up to k and deviations by up to $t$ players with unknown utilities. We…