相关论文: Fair Cake-Cutting in Practice

In the envy-free cake-cutting problem we are given a resource, usually called a cake and represented as the $[0,1]$ interval, and a set of $n$ agents with heterogeneous preferences over pieces of the cake. The goal is to divide the cake…

We study the problem of fairly dividing a heterogeneous resource, commonly known as cake cutting and chore division, in the presence of strategic agents. While a number of results in this setting have been established in previous works,…

In this article we propose a probabilistic framework in order to study the fair division of a divisible good, e.g., a cake, between n players. Our framework follows the same idea than the ''Full independence model'' used in the study of…

In this article we study a cake cutting problem. More precisely, we study symmetric fair division algorithms, that is to say we study algorithms where the order of the players do not influence the value obtained by each player. In the first…

We study the query complexity of cake cutting and give lower and upper bounds for computing approximately envy-free, perfect, and equitable allocations with the minimum number of cuts. The lower bounds are tight for computing connected…

In the classical cake cutting problem, a resource must be divided among agents with different utilities so that each agent believes they have received a fair share of the resource relative to the other agents. We introduce a variant of the…

In classic fair division problems such as cake cutting and rent division, envy-freeness requires that each individual (weakly) prefer his allocation to anyone else's. On a conceptual level, we argue that envy-freeness also provides a…

We study the problem of fairly allocating a divisible resource in the form of a graph, also known as graphical cake cutting. Unlike for the canonical interval cake, a connected envy-free allocation is not guaranteed to exist for a graphical…

We study the existence of fair distributions when we have more guests than pieces to allocate, focusing on envy-free distributions among those who receive a piece. The conditions on the demand from the guests can be weakened from those of…

Cake-cutting is a fundamental model of dividing a heterogeneous resource, such as land, broadcast time, and advertisement space. In this study, we consider the problem of dividing a discrete cake fairly in which the indivisible goods are…

We consider the classic problem of envy-free division of a heterogeneous good ("cake") among several agents. It is known that, when the allotted pieces must be connected, the problem cannot be solved by a finite algorithm for 3 or more…

Relying on configuration spaces and equivariant topology, we study a general "cooperative envy-free division problem". A group of players want to cut a "cake" $I=[0,1]$ and divide among themselves the pieces in an envy-free manner. Once the…

Cake-cutting algorithms, which aim to fairly allocate a continuous resource based on individual agent preferences, have seen significant progress over the past two decades. Much of the research has concentrated on fairness, with…

In cake-cutting, strategy-proofness is a very costly requirement in terms of fairness: for n=2 it implies a dictatorial allocation, whereas for n > 2 it requires that one agent receives no cake. We show that a weaker version of this…

We propose an online form of the cake cutting problem. This models situations where players arrive and depart during the process of dividing a resource. We show that well known fair division procedures like cut-and-choose and the…

We study the problem of fairly allocating a divisible resource, also known as cake cutting, with an additional requirement that the shares that different agents receive should be sufficiently separated from one another. This captures, for…

We study fair mechanisms for the classic job scheduling problem on unrelated machines with the objective of minimizing the makespan. This problem is equivalent to minimizing the egalitarian social cost in the fair division of chores. The…

Cake cutting is one of the most fundamental settings in fair division and mechanism design without money. In this paper, we consider different levels of three fundamental goals in cake cutting: fairness, Pareto optimality, and…

We study the fair allocation of undesirable indivisible items, or chores. While the case of desirable indivisible items (or goods) is extensively studied, with many results known for different notions of fairness, less is known about the…

In the classic problem of fair cake-cutting, a single interval ("cake") has to be divided among n agents with different value measures, giving each agent a single sub-interval with a value of at least 1/n of the total. This paper studies a…