相关论文: Inducing Approximately Optimal Flow Using Truthful…

The paper considers the problem of a leader that seeks to optimally influence the opinions of agents in a directed network through connecting with a limited number of the agents ("direct followers"), possibly in the presence of a fixed…

We introduce a general representation of large-population games in which each player s influence ON the others IS centralized AND limited, but may otherwise be arbitrary.This representation significantly generalizes the class known AS…

Coordination games have been of interest to game theorists, economists, and ecologists for many years to study such problems as the emergence of local conventions and the evolution of cooperative behavior. Approaches for understanding the…

We present a general technique, based on a primal-dual formulation, for analyzing the quality of self-emerging solutions in weighted congestion games. With respect to traditional combinatorial approaches, the primal-dual schema has at least…

To what extent does the structure of the players' strategy space influence the efficiency of decentralized solutions in congestion games? In this work, we investigate whether better performance are possible when restricting to load…

This paper synthesizes anytime algorithms, in the form of continuous-time dynamical systems, to solve monotone variational inequalities. We introduce three algorithms that solve this problem: the projected monotone flow, the safe monotone…

How does one allocate a collection of resources to a set of strategic agents in a fair and efficient manner without using money? For in many scenarios it is not feasible to use money to compensate agents for otherwise unsatisfactory…

In this paper, we aim to mitigate congestion in traffic management systems by guiding travelers along system-optimal (SO) routes. However, we recognize that most theoretical approaches assume perfect driver compliance, which often does not…

Teaming is the process of establishing connections among agents within a system to enable collaboration toward achieving a collective goal. This paper examines teaming in the context of a network of agents learning to coordinate with…

Covering and packing problems can be modeled as games to encapsulate interesting social and engineering settings. These games have a high Price of Anarchy in their natural formulation. However, existing research applicable to specific…

A distortion function, which captures the payoff gap between a player's actual payoff and her true payoff, is introduced and used to analyze games. In our proposed framework, we argue that players' actual payoff functions should be used to…

In communication systems where users share common resources, users' selfish behavior usually results in suboptimal resource utilization. There have been extensive works that model communication systems with selfish users as one-shot games…

Nash`s classical bargaining solution suggests that n players in a non-cooperative bargaining situation should find a solution that maximizes the product of each player's utility functions. We consider a special case: Suppose that the…

Semi-cooperative behaviors are intrinsic properties of human drivers and should be considered for autonomous driving. In addition, new autonomous planners can consider the social value orientation (SVO) of human drivers to generate…

Many real-world systems such as taxi systems, traffic networks and smart grids involve self-interested actors that perform individual tasks in a shared environment. However, in such systems, the self-interested behaviour of agents produces…

How can a system designer exploit system-level knowledge to derive incentives to optimally influence social behavior? The literature on network routing contains many results studying the application of monetary tolls to influence behavior…

This paper addresses the distributed Nash Equilibrium seeking problem for aggregative games, where legitimate players' decisions are affected by potential malicious players. To describe players' behavior, we introduce a novel heterogeneous…

While fictitious play is guaranteed to converge to Nash equilibrium in certain game classes, such as two-player zero-sum games, it is not guaranteed to converge in non-zero-sum and multiplayer games. We show that fictitious play in fact…

We consider strongly monotone games with convex separable coupling constraints, played by dynamical agents, in a partial-decision information scenario. We start by designing continuous-time fully distributed feedback controllers, based on…

For common notions of correlated equilibrium in extensive-form games, computing an optimal (e.g., welfare-maximizing) equilibrium is NP-hard. Other equilibrium notions -- communication (Forges 1986) and certification (Forges & Koessler…