相关论文: Information and Trading Targets in a Dynamic Marke…

We study the perfect information Nash equilibrium between a broker and her clients -- an informed trader and an uniformed trader. In our model, the broker trades in the lit exchange where trades have instantaneous and transient price impact…

We study partial information Nash equilibrium between a broker and an informed trader. In this setting, the informed trader, who possesses knowledge of a trading signal, trades multiple assets with the broker in a dealer market.…

Traders in a market typically have widely different, private information on the return of an asset. The equilibrium price of the asset may reflect this information more accurately if the number of traders is large enough compared to the…

We present a new discrete time version of Kyle's (1985) classic model of insider trading, formulated as a generalised extensive form game. The model has three kinds of traders: an insider, random noise traders, and a market maker. The…

We generalize the seminal framework of Kyle (1985) to a many-asset setting, bridging the gap between informed-trading theory and modern trading practices. Specifically, we formulate an infinite-dimensional Bayesian trading game in which the…

This paper presents an equilibrium model of dynamic trading, learning, and pricing by strategic investors with trading targets and price impact. Since trading targets are private, rebalancers and liquidity providers filter the child order…

We study the continuous time Kyle-Back model with a risk averse informed trader.We show that in a market with multiple assets and non-Gaussian prices an equilibrium exists. The equilibrium is constructed by considering a Fokker-Planck…

The Kyle model describes how an equilibrium of order sizes and security prices naturally arises between a trader with insider information and the price providing market maker as they interact through a series of auctions. Ever since being…

This paper studies the equilibrium pricing of asset shares in the presence of dynamic private information. The market consists of a risk-neutral informed agent who observes the firm value, noise traders, and competitive market makers who…

We consider a market of risky financial assets whose participants are an informed trader, a representative uninformed trader, and noisy liquidity providers. We prove the existence of a market-clearing equilibrium when the insider…

The continuous-time version of Kyle's (1985) model is studied, in which market makers are not fiduciaries. They have some market power which they utilize to set the price to their advantage, resulting in positive expected profits. This has…

This paper considers finitely many investors who perform mean-variance portfolio selection under relative performance criteria. That is, each investor is concerned about not only her terminal wealth, but how it compares to the average…

In this paper, we investigate the seeking of Nash equilibrium (NE) in a non-cooperative quadratic game where all agents exchange their delayed strategy information with their neighbors. To extend best-response algorithms to the delayed…

We consider a trader who aims to liquidate a large position in the presence of an arbitrageur who hopes to profit from the trader's activity. The arbitrageur is uncertain about the trader's position and learns from observed price…

The present paper investigates how insiders strategically navigate ongoing legal risk while leveraging stealth trading within a continuous-time Kyle-type framework. Legal enforcement operates concurrently with trading, which dynamic can be…

We investigate a Kyle model under Gaussian assumptions where a risk-averse informed trader has imperfect information on the fundamental price of an asset. We show that an equilibrium can be constructed by considering an optimal transport…

This paper examines strategic trading under incomplete information, where firms lack full knowledge of key aspects of their competitors' trading strategies such as target sizes and market impact models. We extend previous work on…

In this work, we study the system of interacting non-cooperative two Q-learning agents, where one agent has the privilege of observing the other's actions. We show that this information asymmetry can lead to a stable outcome of population…

Social-media platforms are one of the most prevalent communication media today. In such systems, a large amount of content is generated and available to the platform. However, not all content can be transmitted to every possible user at all…

In this paper, we study the Nash dynamics of strategic interplays of n buyers in a matching market setup by a seller, the market maker. Taking the standard market equilibrium approach, upon receiving submitted bid vectors from the buyers,…