计算机科学与博弈论

We study diversity in approval-based committee elections with incomplete or inaccurate information. We define diversity according to the Maximum Coverage problem, which is known to be $\mathsf{NP}$-complete, with a best attainable…

The rapid growth of mobile social networks (MSNs) has significantly increased the demand for low-latency and reliable content delivery, motivating the deployment of edge caching systems. In practice, multiple content providers (CPs) compete…

We prove the True-KL$_0$ property for a parametric family of heterogeneous scoring rules arising in scored elicitation mechanisms (AI oversight, forecasting competitions, expert surveys). A $d$-dimensional agent with private type $M>1$…

This paper asks whether large language models (LLMs) can be used to study the strategic foundations of conflict and cooperation. I introduce LLMs as experimental subjects in a repeated security dilemma and evaluate whether they reproduce…

We develop a mechanism for unsecured lending among pseudonymous users that does not rely on collateral, legal identity, or centralized underwriting. New borrowers enter only through sponsors who delegate part of their own credit capacity,…

We consider the problem of partitioning an undirected graph (representing a social network) over $n$ nodes and max degree $\Delta$ into $k$ equally sized parts. Each node in the graph, representing an agent, derives utility proportional to…

Strategy-proofness is a fundamental desideratum in mechanism design, ensuring truthful reporting and robust participation. Stability is another central requirement in matching markets, widely adopted in applications such as school choice…

We study finite-horizon two-player zero-sum differential games with one-sided payoff information ($G$), where the informed player (P1) knows the game payoff, while P2 only has a public belief over a finite set of possible payoffs. In this…

Flow games coincide precisely with the fundamental class of non-negative totally balanced games. However, the conditions for their convexity have remained elusive. In this paper, we resolve this challenge by providing a complete…

How hard is it to achieve consensus in a social network under uncertainty? In this paper we model this problem as a social graph of agents where each vertex is initially colored red or blue. The goal of the agents is to achieve consensus,…

We propose a new model for aggregating preferences over a set of indivisible items based on a quantile value. In this model, each agent is endowed with a specific quantile, and the value of a given bundle is defined by the corresponding…

Motivated by the recent popularity of machine learning training services, we introduce a contract design problem in which a provider sells a service that results in an outcome of uncertain quality for the buyer. The seller has a set of…

We study the problem of fairly assigning a set of discrete tasks (or chores) among a set of agents with additive valuations. Each chore is associated with a start and finish time, and each agent can perform at most one chore at any given…

Nearly all simulation-based games have environment parameters that affect incentives in the interaction but are not explicitly incorporated into the game model. To understand the impact of these parameters on strategic incentives, typical…

Equilibrium finding in two-player zero-sum games with perfect recall is a well-studied topic that has led to many breakthroughs in computational game theory. This paper aims to generalize such techniques to (timeable) two-player zero-sum…

Existing auto-bidding algorithms in digital advertising often treat the value of an ad opportunity as the revenue obtained when an ad is shown and/or clicked, and bid accordingly. This can lead to wasteful spending because the true value is…

We revisit games in partition function form, i.e. cooperative games where the payoff of a coalition depends on the partition of the entire set of players. We assume that each coalition computes its worth having probabilistic beliefs over…

Permissionless Proof-of-Stake (PoS) economic security is predicated on the high cost of violating consensus safety or liveness. We show that liquid staking introduces additional risks that are not captured by standard PoS economic security…

Oftentimes, the Shapley value becomes infeasible for games with many players. However, establishing symmetry allows for polynomial-time computation. To examine this reduction, we identify the spectrum of homogeneous group games by using an…

We study hierarchical component selection under severe information constraints. Component quality is not directly observable, each selector observes only the outcome of the chosen pathway, and no explicit evaluation channel crosses module…