相关论文: Backwards-induction outcome in a quantum game

As e-commerce marketplaces continue to grow in popularity, it has become increasingly important to understand the role and impact of marketplace operators on competition and social welfare. We model a marketplace operator as an entity that…

For the classical backward induction algorithm, the input is an arbitrary $n$-person positional game with perfect information modeled by a finite acyclic directed graph (digraph) and the output is a profile $(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ of pure…

In many consumer electronics and appliance markets, manufacturers sell products through competing retailers while simultaneously relying on take-back programs to recover used items for remanufacturing. Designing such programs is challenging…

The global dynamics is investigated for a duopoly game where the perfect foresight hypothesis is relaxed and firms are worst-case maximizers. Overlooking the degree of product substitutability as well as the sensitivity of price to…

This paper is concerned with an overlapping information linear-quadratic (LQ) Stackelberg stochastic differential game with two leaders and two followers, where the diffusion terms of the state equation contain both the control and state…

This paper is concerned with a Stackelberg game of backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs), where the coefficients of the backward system and the cost functionals are deterministic, and the control domain is convex. Necessary and…

We investigate the quantization of games in which the players can access to a continuous set of classical strategies, making use of continuous-variable quantum systems. For the particular case of the Cournot's Duopoly, we find that, even…

We study optimal behavior of energy producers under a CO_2 emission abatement program. We focus on a two-player discrete-time model where each producer is sequentially optimizing her emission and production schedules. The game-theoretic…

We present a quantum approach to a signaling game; a special kind of extensive games of incomplete information. Our model is based on quantum schemes for games in strategic form where players perform unitary operators on their own qubits of…

This paper proposes a novel approach for locally stable convergence to Nash equilibrium in duopoly noncooperative games based on a distributed event-triggered control scheme. The proposed approach employs extremum seeking, with sinusoidal…

Quantum games, like quantum algorithms, exploit quantum entanglement to establish strong correlations between strategic player actions. This paper introduces quantum game-theoretic models applied to trading and demonstrates their…

This paper is concerned with a Stackelberg game of backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs) with partial information, where the information of the follower is a sub-$\sigma$-algebra of that of the leader. Necessary and sufficient…

We consider Stackelberg pricing games, which are also known as bilevel pricing problems, or combinatorial price-setting problems. This family of problems consists of games between two players: the leader and the follower. There is a market…

We study the Stackelberg-Nash null controllability of a coupled system governed by two linear forward stochastic parabolic equations. The system includes one leader control localized in a subset of the domain, two additional leader controls…

This paper focuses on a kind of linear quadratic non-zero sum differential game driven by backward stochastic differential equation with asymmetric information, which is a natural continuation of Wang and Yu [IEEE TAC (2010) 55: 1742-1747,…

The paper analyzes the interactions among one public firm and $n$ private firms on the market, in the framework of a discrete-time Cournot game with time delay. The production of the public firm is influenced by previous output levels of…

This work, based on the author's MA thesis, concentrates on simultaneous move quantum games of two players. A numerical algorithm based on the method of best response functions, designed to search for pure strategy Nash equilibrium in…

In this paper, we investigate a new model of a linear-quadratic mean-field stochastic Stackelberg differential game with one leader and two followers, in which the leader is allowed to stop her strategy at a random time. Our overarching…

This paper considers dynamic (multi-stage) signaling games involving an encoder and a decoder who have subjective models on the cost functions. We consider both Nash (simultaneous-move) and Stackelberg (leader-follower) equilibria of…

For any two-by-two game $\G$, we define a new two-player game $\G^Q$. The definition is motivated by a vision of players in game $\G$ communicating via quantum technology according to a certain standard protocol originally introduced by…