相关论文: An EF2X Allocation Protocol for Restricted Additiv…

The two standard fairness notions in the resource allocation literature are proportionality and envy-freeness. If there are n agents competing for the available resources, then proportionality requires that each agent receives at least a…

We consider the problem of fair allocation of indivisible items with subsidies when agents have weighted entitlements. After highlighting several important differences from the unweighted case, we present several results concerning weighted…

We study envy-free allocations of indivisible goods to agents in settings where each agent is unaware of the goods allocated to other agents. In particular, we propose the maximin aware (MMA) fairness measure, which guarantees that every…

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to a set of agents with additive leveled valuations. A valuation function is called leveled if and only if bundles of larger size have larger value than bundles of smaller size.…

The classic fair division problems assume the resources to be allocated are either divisible or indivisible, or contain a mixture of both, but the agents always have a predetermined and uncontroversial agreement on the (in)divisibility of…

We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods among a set of agents in a fair and efficient manner. An allocation is said to be fair if it is envy-free up to one good (EF1), which means that each agent prefers its own bundle…

We study a resource allocation setting where $m$ discrete items are to be divided among $n$ agents with additive utilities, and the agents' utilities for individual items are drawn at random from a probability distribution. Since common…

We consider the fundamental problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible items among agents having valuations that are represented by a multi-graph -- here, agents appear as vertices and items as edges between them and each vertex…

We study the problem of fairly allocating $m$ indivisible goods to $n$ agents, where agents may have different preferences over the goods. In the traditional setting, agents' valuations are provided as inputs to the algorithm. In this…

We introduce a problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods (items) in which the agents' valuations cannot be observed directly, but instead can only be accessed via noisy queries. In the two-agent setting with Gaussian noise and bounded…

We study the envy free pricing problem faced by a seller who wishes to maximize revenue by setting prices for bundles of items. If there is an unlimited supply of items and agents are single minded then we show that finding the revenue…

We consider the problem of fairly allocating a combination of divisible and indivisible goods. While fairness criteria like envy-freeness (EF) and proportionality (PROP) can always be achieved for divisible goods, only their relaxed…

We consider two models of fair division with indivisible items: one for goods and one for bads. For goods, we study two generalized envy freeness proxies (EF1 and EFX for goods) and three common welfare (utilitarian, egalitarian and Nash)…

We study the problem of fair and efficient allocation of a set of indivisible goods to agents with additive valuations using the popular fairness notions of envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) and equitability up to one good (EQ1) in…

We study fair division of divisible goods under generalized assignment constraints. Here, each good has an agent-specific value and size, and every agent has a budget constraint that limits the total size of the goods she can receive. Since…

This paper explores the fair allocation of indivisible items in a multidimensional setting, motivated by the need to address fairness in complex environments where agents assess bundles according to multiple criteria. Such multidimensional…

We study the allocation of indivisible goods among groups of agents using well-known fairness notions such as envy-freeness and proportionality. While these notions cannot always be satisfied, we provide several bounds on the optimal…

We consider the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. Ex-ante fairness (proportionality) can trivially be obtained by giving all goods to a random agent. Yet, such an allocation is…

We explore solutions for fairly allocating indivisible items among agents assigned weights representing their entitlements. Our fairness goal is weighted-envy-freeness (WEF), where each agent deems their allocated portion relative to their…

Fair allocation of indivisible goods has attracted extensive attention over the last two decades, yielding numerous elegant algorithmic results and producing challenging open questions. The problem becomes much harder in the presence of…