相关论文: Competition in Electric Autonomous Mobility on Dem…

We consider the situation where multiple transportation service providers cooperate to offer an integrated multi-modal platform to enhance the convenience to the passengers through ease in multi-modal journey planning, payment, and first…

We study a pricing game in multi-hop relay networks where nodes price their services and route their traffic selfishly and strategically. In this game, each node (1) announces pricing functions which specify the payments it demands from its…

In many markets, like electricity or cloud computing markets, providers incur large costs for keeping sufficient capacity in reserve to accommodate demand fluctuations of a mostly fixed user base. These costs are significantly affected by…

On-demand transport services in the form of dial-a-ride and taxis are crucial parts of the transport infrastructure in all major cities. However, not all on-demand transport services are equal. In particular, not-for-profit dial-a-ride…

We analyze digital markets where a monopolist platform uses data to match multiproduct sellers with heterogeneous consumers who can purchase both on and off the platform. The platform sells targeted ads to sellers that recommend their…

Mobility-on-Demand platforms are a fast growing component of the urban transit ecosystem. Though a growing literature addresses the question of how to make individual MoD platforms more efficient, much less is known about the cost of market…

There is a fierce competition between two-sided mobility platforms (e.g., Uber and Lyft) fueled by massive subsidies, yet the underlying dynamics and interactions between the competing plat-forms are largely unknown. These platforms rely on…

In this paper, we consider microgrids that interconnect prosumers with distributed energy resources and dynamic loads. Prosumers are connected through the microgrid to trade energy and gain profit while respecting the network constraints.…

Cities worldwide struggle with overloaded transportation systems and their externalities. The emerging autonomous transportation technology has the potential to alleviate these issues, but the decisions of profit-maximizing operators…

We study the interaction between a fleet of electric, self-driving vehicles servicing on-demand transportation requests (referred to as Autonomous Mobility-on-Demand, or AMoD, system) and the electric power network. We propose a model that…

Dynamic pricing schemes are increasingly employed across industries to maintain a self-organized balance of demand and supply. However, throughout complex dynamical systems, unintended collective states exist that may compromise their…

We empirically study the interplay between exploration and competition. Systems that learn from interactions with users often engage in exploration: making potentially suboptimal decisions in order to acquire new information for future…

In this paper, we study the potential benefits from smart charging for a fleet of electric vehicles (EVs) providing autonomous mobility-on-demand (AMoD) services. We first consider a profit-maximizing platform operator who makes decisions…

We consider ride-sharing networks served byhuman-driven vehicles and autonomous vehicles. First, wepropose a novel model for ride-sharing in this mixed autonomysetting for a multi-location network in which the platformsets prices for…

This paper considers competitive mobility-on-demand systems where a group of vehicle sharing companies, on one hand, want to collectively regulate the traffic of the user queueing network, and on the other hand, maximize their own profits…

The advent of autonomous driving and electrification is enabling the deployment of Electric Autonomous Mobility-on-Demand (E-AMoD) systems, whereby electric autonomous vehicles provide on-demand mobility. Crucially, the design of the…

How does competition in markets for information affect the creation and division of surplus? We study this question in a search environment in which an agent searches sequentially for a high-quality good and learns about the quality of…

We analyse a non-cooperative game between two competing ride-hailing platforms, each of which is modeled as a two-sided queueing system, where drivers (with a limited level of patience) are assumed to arrive according to a Poisson process…

This paper studies Markov perfect equilibria in a repeated duopoly model where sellers choose algorithms. An algorithm is a mapping from the competitor's price to own price. Once set, algorithms respond quickly. Customers arrive randomly…

We study the efficiency of allocations in large markets with a network structure where every seller owns an edge in a graph and every buyer desires a path connecting some nodes. While it is known that stable allocations in such settings can…