相关论文: Envy-freeness and Relaxed Stability under lower qu…

In the Hospitals/Residents problem, every hospital has an upper quota that limits the number of residents assigned to it. While, in some applications, each hospital also has a lower quota for the number of residents it receives. In this…

While every instance of the Hospitals/Residents problem admits a stable matching, the problem with lower quotas (HR-LQ) has instances with no stable matching. For such an instance, we expect the existence of an envy-free matching, which is…

We consider the problem of assigning agents to programs in the presence of two-sided preferences, commonly known as the Hospital Residents problem. In the standard setting each program has a rigid upper-quota which cannot be violated.…

We consider the problem of assigning agents to resources under the two-sided preference list model where resources specify an upper-quota and a lower-quota, that is, respectively the maximum and minimum number of agents that can be assigned…

In this paper, we consider the Hospital Residents problem (HR) and the Hospital Residents problem with Lower Quotas (HRLQ). In this model with two sided preferences, stability is a well accepted notion of optimality. However, in the…

Fair division has emerged as a very hot topic in multiagent systems, and envy-freeness is among the most compelling fairness concepts. An allocation of indivisible items to agents is envy-free if no agent prefers the bundle of any other…

Stability is crucial in matching markets, yet in many real-world settings - from hospital residency allocations to roommate assignments - full stability is either impossible to achieve or can come at the cost of leaving many agents…

We consider stability concepts for random matchings where agents have preferences over objects and objects have priorities for the agents. When matchings are deterministic, the standard stability concept also captures the fairness property…

In this paper, we consider one-to-one matchings between two disjoint groups of agents. Each agent has a preference over a subset of the agents in the other group, and these preferences may contain ties. Strong stability is one of the…

Motivated by the serious problem that hospitals in rural areas suffer from a shortage of residents, we study the Hospitals/Residents model in which hospitals are associated with lower quotas and the objective is to satisfy them as much as…

In the multidimensional stable roommate problem, agents have to be allocated to rooms and have preferences over sets of potential roommates. We study the complexity of finding good allocations of agents to rooms under the assumption that…

We study the two-sided stable matching problem with one-sided uncertainty for two sets of agents A and B, with equal cardinality. Initially, the preference lists of the agents in A are given but the preferences of the agents in B are…

Two-sided matching, such as matching between students and schools, has been applied to various aspects of real life and has been the subject of much research, however, it has been plagued by the fact that efficiency and fairness are…

We study the many-to-many bipartite matching problem in the presence of preferences where ties, as well as lower quotas, may appear on both sides of the bipartition. The input is a bipartite graph $G=(A \cup B, E)$, where each vertex in $A…

Envy-freeness is a standard benchmark of fairness in resource allocation. Since it cannot always be satisfied when the resource consists of indivisible items even when there are two agents, the relaxations envy-freeness up to one item (EF1)…

The stable marriage and stable roommates problems have been extensively studied due to their high applicability in various real-world scenarios. However, it might happen that no stable solution exists, or stable solutions do not meet…

In fair division problems with indivisible goods it is well known that one cannot have any guarantees for the classic fairness notions of envy-freeness and proportionality. As a result, several relaxations have been introduced, most of…

We consider the Hospitals/Residents (HR) problem in the presence of ties in hospital preferences. Among the three notions of stability, namely weak stability, strong stability, and super-stability, we focus on the notion of strong…

Stable matching is a fundamental area with many practical applications, such as centralised clearinghouses for school choice or job markets. Recent work has introduced the paradigm of near-feasibility in capacitated matching settings, where…

The Stable Roommates problems are characterized by the preferences of agents over other agents as roommates. A solution is a partition of the agents into pairs that are acceptable to each other (i.e., they are in the preference lists of…