相关论文: Equilibrium Computation in Atomic Splittable Routi…

In this paper, we consider a dynamic equilibrium transportation problem. There is a fixed number of cars moving from origin to destination areas. Preferences for arrival times are expressed as a cost of arriving before or after the…

In game theory, mechanism design is concerned with the design of incentives so that a desired outcome of the game can be achieved. In this paper, we study the design of incentives so that a desirable equilibrium is obtained, for instance,…

We present a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS) for computing equilibria in congestion games, under smoothed running-time analysis. More precisely, we prove that if the resource costs of a congestion game are randomly…

In this paper we present a new competitive packet routing model with edge priorities. We consider players that route selfishly through a network over time and try to reach their destinations as fast as possible. If the number of players who…

The optimal value computation for turned-based stochastic games with reachability objectives, also known as simple stochastic games, is one of the few problems in $NP \cap coNP$ which are not known to be in $P$. However, there are some…

This work analyzes the minimum tollbooth problem in atomic network congestion games with unsplittable flows. The goal is to place tolls on edges, such that there exists a pure Nash equilibrium in the tolled game that is a social optimum in…

This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept "robust perfect equilibrium" for non-cooperative games with a continuum of players, incorporating three types of perturbations. Such an equilibrium is shown to exist (in symmetric mixed…

We study equilibrium computation with extensive-form correlation in two-player turn-taking stochastic games. Our main results are two-fold: (1) We give an algorithm for computing a Stackelberg extensive-form correlated equilibrium (SEFCE),…

We study the complexity of equilibrium computation in discrete preference games. These games were introduced by Chierichetti, Kleinberg, and Oren (EC '13, JCSS '18) to model decision-making by agents in a social network that choose a…

Nash equilibrium is one of the most influential solution concepts in game theory. With the development of computer science and artificial intelligence, there is an increasing demand on Nash equilibrium computation, especially for Internet…

In this paper we introduce the novel framework of distributionally robust games. These are multi-player games where each player models the state of nature using a worst-case distribution, also called adversarial distribution. Thus each…

This work proposes a novel distributed approach for computing a Nash equilibrium in convex games with restricted strongly monotone pseudo-gradients. By leveraging the idea of the centralized operator extrapolation method presented in [4] to…

Reward allocation, also known as the credit assignment problem, has been an important topic in economics, engineering, and machine learning. An important concept in reward allocation is the core, which is the set of stable allocations where…

How can we design mechanisms to promote efficient use of shared resources? Here, we answer this question in relation to the well-studied class of atomic congestion games, used to model a variety of problems, including traffic routing.…

Colonel Blotto games with discrete strategy spaces effectively illustrate the intricate nature of multidimensional strategic reasoning. This paper studies the equilibrium set of such games where, in line with prior experimental work, the…

Motivated by applications in job scheduling, queuing networks, and load balancing in cyber-physical systems, we develop and analyze a game-theoretic framework to balance the load among servers in static and dynamic settings. In these…

We introduce Shortest Connection Game, a two-player game played on a directed graph with edge costs. Given two designated vertices in which they start, the players take turns in choosing edges emanating from the vertex they are currently…

We consider the complexity of finding a correlated equilibrium of an $n$-player game in a model that allows the algorithm to make queries on players' payoffs at pure strategy profiles. Randomized regret-based dynamics are known to yield an…

Equilibrium computation in markets usually considers settings where player valuation functions are known. We consider the setting where player valuations are unknown; using a PAC learning-theoretic framework, we analyze some classes of…

Correlated equilibria are a fundamental solution concept in game theory. However, despite decades of research, the complexity beyond games of polynomial type -- such as extensive-form games, congestion or routing games, and more broadly…