Robust perfect equilibrium in large games
Abstract
This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept "robust perfect equilibrium" for non-cooperative games with a continuum of players, incorporating three types of perturbations. Such an equilibrium is shown to exist (in symmetric mixed strategies and in pure strategies) and satisfy the important properties of admissibility, aggregate robustness, and ex post robust perfection. These properties strengthen relevant equilibrium results in an extensive literature on strategic interactions among a large number of agents. Illustrative applications to congestion games and potential games are presented. In the particular case of a congestion game with strictly increasing cost functions, we show that there is a unique symmetric robust perfect equilibrium.
Cite
@article{arxiv.1912.12908,
title = {Robust perfect equilibrium in large games},
author = {Enxian Chen and Lei Qiao and Xiang Sun and Yeneng Sun},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1912.12908},
year = {2021}
}