相关论文: Selfish Knapsack

We investigate the problem of designing randomized obviously strategy-proof (OSP) mechanisms in several canonical auction settings. Obvious strategy-proofness, introduced by Li [American Economic Review, 2017], strengthens the well-known…

We revisit the well-studied problem of designing mechanisms for one-sided matching markets, where a set of $n$ agents needs to be matched to a set of $n$ heterogeneous items. Each agent $i$ has a value $v_{i,j}$ for each item $j$, and these…

A typical viral marketing model identifies influential users in a social network to maximize a single product adoption assuming unlimited user attention, campaign budgets, and time. In reality, multiple products need campaigns, users have…

We consider a feature-based personalized pricing problem in which the buyer is strategic: given the seller's pricing policy, the buyer can augment the features that they reveal to the seller to obtain a low price for the product. We model…

Evolutionary algorithms have been applied to a wide range of stochastic problems. Motivated by real-world problems where constraint violations have disruptive effects, this paper considers the chance-constrained knapsack problem (CCKP)…

We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among strategic agents. We focus on settings wherein monetary transfers are not available and each agent's private valuation is a submodular function with binary marginals, i.e., the…

It is widely believed that computing payments needed to induce truthful bidding is somehow harder than simply computing the allocation. We show that the opposite is true: creating a randomized truthful mechanism is essentially as easy as a…

We revisit the Stochastic Knapsack problem, where a policy-maker chooses an execution order for jobs with fixed values and stochastic running-times, aiming to maximize the value completed by a deadline. Dean et al. (FOCS'04) show that…

We study the problem of stochastic bandits with adversarial corruptions in the cooperative multi-agent setting, where $V$ agents interact with a common $K$-armed bandit problem, and each pair of agents can communicate with each other to…

The problem of scheduling unrelated machines has been studied since the inception of algorithmic mechanism design \cite{NR99}. It is a resource allocation problem that entails assigning $m$ tasks to $n$ machines for execution. Machines are…

We consider $k$-Facility Location games, where $n$ strategic agents report their locations on the real line, and a mechanism maps them to $k\ge 2$ facilities. Each agent seeks to minimize her distance to the nearest facility. We are…

We consider the problem of selfish agents in discrete-time queuing systems, where competitive queues try to get their packets served. In this model, a queue gets to send a packet each step to one of the servers, which will attempt to serve…

We develop approximation algorithms for set-selection problems with deterministic constraints, but random objective values, i.e., stochastic probing problems. When the goal is to maximize the objective, approximation algorithms for probing…

In this research, we study the problem that a collector acquires items from the owner based on the item qualities the owner declares and an independent appraiser's assessments. The owner is interested in maximizing the probability that the…

The deferred acceptance algorithm is an elegant solution to the stable matching problem that guarantees optimality and truthfulness for one side of the market. Despite these desirable guarantees, it is susceptible to strategic misreporting…

We study the uniform $2$-dimensional vector multiple knapsack (2VMK) problem, a natural variant of multiple knapsack arising in real-world applications such as virtual machine placement. The input for 2VMK is a set of items, each associated…

We study the Price of Anarchy of mechanisms for the well-known problem of one-sided matching, or house allocation, with respect to the social welfare objective. We consider both ordinal mechanisms, where agents submit preference lists over…

We consider a fundamental dynamic allocation problem motivated by the problem of $\textit{securities lending}$ in financial markets, the mechanism underlying the short selling of stocks. A lender would like to distribute a finite number of…

We address a generalization of the bandit with knapsacks problem, where a learner aims to maximize rewards while satisfying an arbitrary set of long-term constraints. Our goal is to design best-of-both-worlds algorithms that perform…

We present a simple combinatorial $\frac{1 -e^{-2}}{2}$-approximation algorithm for maximizing a monotone submodular function subject to a knapsack and a matroid constraint. This classic problem is known to be hard to approximate within…