计算机科学与博弈论

Prophet inequalities are a useful tool for designing online allocation procedures and comparing their performance to the optimal offline allocation. In the basic setting of $k$-unit prophet inequalities, the well-known procedure of Alaei…

This paper concerns the mechanism design for online resource allocation in a strategic setting. In this setting, a single supplier allocates capacity-limited resources to requests that arrive in a sequential and arbitrary manner. Each…

This work explores the relationship between the set of Wardrop equilibria~(WE) of a routing game, the total demand of that game, and the occurrence of Braess's paradox~(BP). The BP formalizes the counter-intuitive fact that for some…

We consider the problem of locating a facility to serve a set of agents located along a line. The Nash welfare objective function, defined as the product of the agents' utilities, is known to provide a compromise between fairness and…

In PCNs, nodes that forward payments between a source and a receiver are paid a small fee if the payment is successful. The fee is a compensation for temporarily committing funds to the payment. However, payments may fail due to…

An electorate with fully-ranked innate preferences casts approval votes over a finite set of alternatives. As a result, only partial information about the true preferences is revealed to the voting authorities. In an effort to understand…

We study the convergence of best-response dynamics in Tullock contests with convex cost functions (these games always have a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium). We show that best-response dynamics rapidly converges to the equilibrium…

This paper studies a multi-player, general-sum stochastic game characterized by a dual-stage temporal structure per period. The agents face uncertainty regarding the time-evolving state that is realized at the beginning of each period.…

Equilibria in auctions can be very difficult to analyze, beyond the symmetric environments where revenue equivalence renders the analysis straightforward. This paper takes a robust approach to evaluating the equilibria of auctions. Rather…

We study the price of anarchy of the generalized second-price auction where bidders are value maximizers (i.e., autobidders). We show that in general the price of anarchy can be as bad as $0$. For comparison, the price of anarchy of running…

We introduce a class of Bayesian bidding games for which we prove that the set of pure Nash equilibria is a (non-empty) sublattice and we give a sufficient condition for uniqueness that is often verified in the context of markets with…

Last-iterate convergence has received extensive study in two player zero-sum games starting from bilinear, convex-concave up to settings that satisfy the MVI condition. Typical methods that exhibit last-iterate convergence for the…

We study shared sequencing for different chains from an economic angle. We introduce a minimal non-trivial model that captures cross-domain arbitrageurs' behavior and compare the performance of shared sequencing to that of separate…

Fictitious Play (FP) is a simple and natural dynamic for repeated play with many applications in game theory and multi-agent reinforcement learning. It was introduced by Brown (1949,1951) and its convergence properties for two-player…

Motivated by practical constraints in online advertising, we investigate single-parameter auction design for bidders with constraints on their Return On Investment (ROI) -- a targeted minimum ratio between the obtained value and the…

Intelligent transportation systems (ITS) have gained significant attention from various communities, driven by rapid advancements in informational technology. Within the realm of ITS, navigational recommendation systems (RS) play a pivotal…

Corruptive majority attacks, in which mining power is distributed among miners and an attacker attempts to bribe a majority of miners into participation in a majority attack, pose a threat to blockchains. Budish bounded the cost of bribing…

The incentive-compatibility properties of blockchain transaction fee mechanisms have been investigated with *passive* block producers that are motivated purely by the net rewards earned at the consensus layer. This paper introduces a model…

The main ambition of this thesis is to contribute to the development of cooperative game theory towards combinatorics, algorithmics and discrete geometry. Therefore, the first chapter of this manuscript is devoted to highlighting the…

\textit{Fair division} of resources among competing agents is a fundamental problem in computational social choice and economic game theory. It has been intensively studied on various kinds of items (\textit{divisible} and…