计算机科学与博弈论

We study $n$-agent Bayesian Games with $m$-dimensional vector types and linear payoffs, also called Linear Multidimensional Bayesian Games. This class of games is equivalent with $n$-agent, $m$-game Uniform Multigames. We distinguish…

Renewable distributed energy resources (DERs) have the potential to provide multi-location electricity consumers (MLECs) with electricity at prices lower than those offered by the grid using behind-the-meter advantages. This study examines…

We study functions that produce a ranking of $n$ individuals from $n$ such rankings and are impartial in the sense that the position of an individual in the output ranking does not depend on the input ranking submitted by that individual.…

We consider the classical linear assignment problem, and we introduce new auction algorithms for its optimal and suboptimal solution. The algorithms are founded on duality theory, and are related to ideas of competitive bidding by persons…

We consider the problem of guaranteeing maximin-share (MMS) when allocating a set of indivisible items to a set of agents with fractionally subadditive (XOS) valuations. For XOS valuations, it has been previously shown that for some…

This paper discusses the problem of efficiently solving parity games where player Odd has to obey an additional 'strong transition fairness constraint' on its vertices -- given that a player Odd vertex $v$ is visited infinitely often, a…

In this paper, we consider a learning problem among non-cooperative agents interacting in a time-varying system. Specifically, we focus on repeated linear quadratic network games, in which the network of interactions changes with time and…

In enterprise cloud computing, there is a big and increasing investment to move to multi-cloud computing, which allows enterprises to seamlessly utilize IT resources from multiple cloud providers, so as to take advantage of different cloud…

In this paper, we present a model of a game among teams. Each team consists of a homogeneous population of agents. Agents within a team are cooperative while the teams compete with other teams. The dynamics and the costs are coupled through…

In this paper, we explore the Mechanism Design aspects of the Maximum Vertex-weighted $b$-Matching (MVbM) problem on bipartite graphs $(A\cup T, E)$. The set $A$ comprises agents, while $T$ represents tasks. The set $E$ is the private…

This paper presents a distributed communication model to investigate multistable perception, where a stimulus gives rise to multiple competing perceptual interpretations. We formalize stable perception as consensus achieved through…

Information Elicitation Without Verification (IEWV) refers to the problem of eliciting high-accuracy solutions from crowd members when the ground truth is unverifiable. A high-accuracy team solution (aggregated from members' solutions)…

The ability to measure the satisfaction of (groups of) voters is a crucial prerequisite for formulating proportionality axioms in approval-based participatory budgeting elections. Two common - but very different - ways to measure the…

We give a simple proof of the well-known result that the marginal strategies of a coarse correlated equilibrium form a Nash equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games. A corollary of this fact is that no-external-regret learning algorithms…

We introduce a class of strategic games in which agents are assigned to nodes of a topology graph and the utility of an agent depends on both the agent's inherent utilities for other agents as well as her distance from these agents on the…

Participatory Budgeting (PB) is a form of participatory democracy in which citizens select a set of projects to be implemented, subject to a budget constraint. The Method of Equal Shares (MES), introduced in [18], is a simple iterative…

We introduce a simple extensive-form algorithm for finding equilibria of two-player, zero-sum games. The algorithm is realization equivalent to a generalized form of Fictitious Play. We compare its performance to that of a similar…

This work studies the parameter identification problem of a generalized non-cooperative game, where each player's cost function is influenced by an observable signal and some unknown parameters. We consider the scenario where equilibrium of…

I propose an alternative algorithm to compute the MMS voting rule. Instead of using linear programming, in this new algorithm the maximin support value of a committee is computed using a sequence of maximum flow problems.

We study non-monetary mechanisms for the fair and efficient allocation of reusable public resources, i.e., resources used for varying durations. We consider settings where a limited resource is repeatedly shared among a set of agents, each…