计算机科学与博弈论

Community engagement plays a critical role in anti-poaching efforts, yet existing mathematical models aimed at enhancing this engagement often overlook direct participation by community members as alternative patrollers. Unlike professional…

We study bilateral trade with a broker, where a buyer and seller interact exclusively through the broker. The broker strategically maximizes her payoff through arbitrage by trading with the buyer and seller at different prices. We study…

Today, many auctions are carried out with the help of intermediary platforms like Google and eBay. We refer to such auctions as platform-assisted auctions.Traditionally, the auction theory literature mainly focuses on designing auctions…

Decoding how rational agents should behave in shared systems remains a critical challenge within theoretical computer science, artificial intelligence and economics studies. Central to this challenge is the task of computing the solution…

In perpetual voting, multiple decisions are made at different moments in time. Taking the history of previous decisions into account allows us to satisfy properties such as proportionality over periods of time. In this paper, we consider…

We study almost-envy-freeness in house allocation, where $m$ houses are to be allocated among $n$ agents so that every agent receives exactly one house. An envy-free allocation need not exist, and therefore we may have to settle for…

Hand abstraction has been instrumental in developing powerful AI for Texas Hold'em poker, a widely studied testbed for imperfect information games (IIGs). Despite its success, the hand abstraction task lacks robust theoretical tools,…

We study the fundamental, classical mechanism design problem of single-buyer multi-item Bayesian revenue-maximizing auctions under the lens of communication complexity between the buyer and the seller. Specifically, we ask whether using…

The minimax theorem for zero-sum games is easily proved from the strong duality theorem of linear programming. For the converse direction, the standard proof by Dantzig (1951) is known to be incomplete. We explain and combine classical…

We adopt a parametric approach to analyze the worst-case degradation in social welfare when the allocation of indivisible goods is constrained to be fair. Specifically, we are concerned with cardinality-constrained allocations, which…

In high-risk environments where unlawful surveillance is prevalent, securing confidential communications is critical. This study introduces a novel steganographic game-theoretic model to analyze the strategic interactions between a…

Unlike ordinal-utility matching markets, which are well-developed from the viewpoint of both theory and practice, recent insights from a computer science perspective have left cardinal-utility matching markets in a state of flux. The…

Mechanism design in resource allocation studies dividing limited resources among self-interested agents whose satisfaction with the allocation depends on privately held utilities. We consider the problem in a payment-free setting, with the…

In this paper, we study non-obvious manipulability (NOM), a relaxed form of strategyproofness, in the context of Hedonic Games (HGs) with Friends Appreciation (FA) preferences. In HGs, the aim is to partition agents into coalitions…

We study the distributed facility location games with candidate locations, where agents on a line are partitioned into groups. Both desirable and obnoxious facility location settings are discussed. In distributed location problems,…

A recent theory shows that a multi-player decentralized partially observable Markov decision process can be transformed into an equivalent single-player game, enabling the application of \citeauthor{bellman}'s principle of optimality to…

Recent advances in Machine Learning (ML) and Artificial Intelligence (AI) follow a familiar structure: A firm releases a large, pretrained model. It is designed to be adapted and tweaked by other entities to perform particular,…

We study the problem of determining an envy-free allocation of indivisible goods among multiple agents with additive valuations. EFX, which stands for envy-freeness up to any good, is a well-studied relaxation of the envy-free allocation…

We consider a refinement to the notions of collusion-resistance in transaction fee mechanisms. In particular, we require that the collusion is by itself incentive-compatible and individually rational to all of its participants. We then…

Motivated by the success of Nesterov's accelerated gradient algorithm for convex minimization problems, we examine whether it is possible to achieve similar performance gains in the context of online learning in games. To that end, we…