相关论文: How competitive are pay-as-bid auction games?

Spot electricity markets are considered under a Game-Theoretic framework, where risk averse players submit orders to the market clearing mechanism to maximise their own utility. Consistent with the current practice in Europe, the market…

In this paper, we formulate an evolutionary multiple access channel game with continuous-variable actions and coupled rate constraints. We characterize Nash equilibria of the game and show that the pure Nash equilibria are Pareto optimal…

Motivated by sponsored search auctions, we study multi-unit auctions with budget constraints. In the mechanism we propose, Sort-Cut, understating budgets or values is weakly dominated. Since Sort-Cut's revenue is increasing in budgets and…

Nearly a decade ago, Azrieli and Shmaya introduced the class of $\lambda$-Lipschitz games in which every player's payoff function is $\lambda$-Lipschitz with respect to the actions of the other players. They showed that such games admit…

We study the efficiency of sequential first-price item auctions at (subgame perfect) equilibrium. This auction format has recently attracted much attention, with previous work establishing positive results for unit-demand valuations and…

We consider the problem of computing a (pure) Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the first-price auction with continuous value distributions and discrete bidding space. We prove that when bidders have independent subjective prior beliefs about the…

We study buyer-optimal procurement mechanisms when quality is contractible. When some costs are borne by every participant of a procurement auction regardless of winning, the classic analysis should be amended. We show that an optimal…

We formulate and study a two-player static duel game as a nonzero-sum discounted stochastic game. Players $P_{1},P_{2}$ are standing in place and, in each turn, one or both may shoot at the other player. If $P_{n}$ shoots at $P_{m}$ ($m\neq…

We study oligopolistic competition in service markets where firms offer a service to customers. The service quality of a firm - from the perspective of a customer - depends on the congestion and the charged price. A firm can set a price for…

We consider a price competition between two sellers of perfect-complement goods. Each seller posts a price for the good it sells, but the demand is determined according to the sum of prices. This is a classic model by Cournot (1838), who…

We consider a Nash equilibrium between two high-frequency traders in a simple market impact model with transient price impact and additional quadratic transaction costs. Extending a result by Sch\"oneborn (2008), we prove existence and…

In this paper, we compute $\epsilon$-approximate Nash equilibria in atomic splittable polymatroid congestion games with convex Lipschitz continuous cost functions. The main approach relies on computing a pure Nash equilibrium for an…

We study the inefficiency of equilibria for various classes of games when players are (partially) altruistic. We model altruistic behavior by assuming that player i's perceived cost is a convex combination of 1-\alpha_i times his direct…

Incorporating budget constraints into the analysis of auctions has become increasingly important, as they model practical settings more accurately. The social welfare function, which is the standard measure of efficiency in auctions, is…

We consider the problem of optimal charging of plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs). We treat this problem as a multi-agent game, where vehicles/agents are heterogeneous since they are subject to possibly different constraints. Under the…

As is well known, many classes of markets have efficient equilibria, but this depends on agents being non-strategic, i.e. that they declare their true demands when offered goods at particular prices, or in other words, that they are…

We consider the computation of an equilibrium of a stochastic Nash equilibrium problem, where the player objectives are assumed to be $L_0$-Lipschitz continuous and convex given rival decisions with convex and closed player-specific…

We study competitive equilibria in the classic Shapley-Shubik assignment model with indivisible goods and unit-demand buyers, with budget constraints: buyers can specify a maximum price they are willing to pay for each item, beyond which…

We consider price competition among multiple sellers over a selling horizon of $T$ periods. In each period, sellers simultaneously offer their prices (which are made public) and subsequently observe their respective demand (not made…

In this paper we consider strategic cost sharing games with so-called arbitrary sharing based on various combinatorial optimization problems, such as vertex and set cover, facility location, and network design problems. We concentrate on…