相关论文: Settling the Communication Complexity of VCG-based…

In this work we study the metric distortion problem in voting theory under a limited amount of ordinal information. Our primary contribution is threefold. First, we consider mechanisms which perform a sequence of pairwise comparisons…

We consider the single-item interdependent value setting, where there is a monopolist, $n$ buyers, and each buyer has a private signal $s_i$ describing a piece of information about the item. Each bidder $i$ also has a valuation function…

Currently, most ISOs adopt offer cost minimization (OCM) auction mechanism which minimizes the total offer cost, and then, a settlement rule based on either locational marginal prices (LMPs) or market clearing price (MCP) is used to…

We study auction design within the widely acclaimed model of interdependent values, introduced by Milgrom and Weber [1982]. In this model, every bidder $i$ has a private signal $s_i$ for the item for sale, and a public valuation function…

To support a freight carrier in a combinatorial transport auction, we proposes an exact and two heuristic strategies for bidding on subsets of requests. The exact bidding strategy is based on the concept of elementary request combinations.…

We study buyer-optimal procurement mechanisms when quality is contractible. When some costs are borne by every participant of a procurement auction regardless of winning, the classic analysis should be amended. We show that an optimal…

We consider the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among $n$ agents with additive valuations, using the popular fairness notion of maximin share (MMS). Since MMS allocations do not always exist, a series of works…

Consider the following social choice problem. Suppose we have a set of $n$ voters and $m$ candidates that lie in a metric space. The goal is to design a mechanism to choose a candidate whose average distance to the voters is as small as…

We consider the Max-Buying Problem with Limited Supply, in which there are $n$ items, with $C_i$ copies of each item $i$, and $m$ bidders such that every bidder $b$ has valuation $v_{ib}$ for item $i$. The goal is to find a pricing $p$ and…

A rapidly growing literature on lying in behavioral economics and psychology shows that individuals often do not lie even when lying maximizes their utility. In this work, we attempt to incorporate these findings into the theory of…

We study truthful auctions for secondary spectrum usage in wireless networks. In this scenario, n communication requests need to be allocated to k available channels that are subject to interference and noise. We present the first truthful…

Budget feasible mechanisms, recently initiated by Singer (FOCS 2010), extend algorithmic mechanism design problems to a realistic setting with a budget constraint. We consider the problem of designing truthful budget feasible mechanisms for…

We settle the complexities of the maximum-cardinality bipartite matching problem (BMM) up to poly-logarithmic factors in five models of computation: the two-party communication, AND query, OR query, XOR query, and quantum edge query models.…

We consider a dynamic mechanism design problem where an auctioneer sells an indivisible good to groups of buyers in every round, for a total of $T$ rounds. The auctioneer aims to maximize their discounted overall revenue while adhering to a…

We show that real-value approximations of Kolmogorov-Chaitin (K_m) using the algorithmic Coding theorem as calculated from the output frequency of a large set of small deterministic Turing machines with up to 5 states (and 2 symbols), is in…

This paper analyzes individually-rational ex post equilibrium in the VC (Vickrey-Clarke) combinatorial auctions. If $\Sigma$ is a family of bundles of goods, the organizer may restrict the participants by requiring them to submit their bids…

We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with $n$ items facing a single buyer. We introduce the notion of symmetric menu complexity of a mechanism, which counts the number of distinct options the buyer may purchase, up to permutations of the…

We consider the communication complexity of finding an approximate maximum matching in a graph in a multi-party message-passing communication model. The maximum matching problem is one of the most fundamental graph combinatorial problems,…

This paper studies optimal auction design when valuations depend endogenously on post-auction collaboration between the seller and the winning bidder. Both parties exert non-contractible efforts after the auction, generating a double moral…

For revenue and welfare maximization in single-dimensional Bayesian settings, Chawla et al. (STOC10) recently showed that sequential posted-price mechanisms (SPMs), though simple in form, can perform surprisingly well compared to the…