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There are two well-known sufficient conditions for Nash equilibrium in two-player games: mutual knowledge of rationality (MKR) and mutual knowledge of conjectures. MKR assumes that the concept of rationality is mutually known. In contrast,…

Nash equilibrium is perhaps the best-known solution concept in game theory. Such a solution assigns a strategy to each player which offers no incentive to unilaterally deviate. While a Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to always exist, the…

We study the problem of computing an $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium in repeated games. Earlier work by Borgs et al. [2010] suggests that this problem is intractable. We show that if we make a slight change to their model---modeling the players…

The theory of quantum games permits players to choose strategies that prepare and measure quantum states. Whereas conventional game theory provides guarantees for fixed-point stability in non-cooperative games, so-called Nash equilibria, we…

Contrary to the customary view that the celebrated Nash-equilibrium theorem in Game Theory is paradigmatic for non-cooperative games, it is shown that, in fact, it is essentially based on a particularly strong cooperation assumption.…

In this paper, we study Nash equilibrium payoffs for nonzero-sum stochastic differential games via the theory of backward stochastic differential equations. We obtain an existence theorem and a characterization theorem of Nash equilibrium…

In this paper, we introduce the concepts of weaknorm, quasi-weaknorm on real vector spaces. By these concepts, we introduce the concept of quasi-locally convex topological vector spaces, which include locally convex topological vector…

The paper is concerned with a two-player nonzero-sum differential game in the case when players are informed about the current position. We consider the game in control with guide strategies first proposed by Krasovskii and Subbotin. The…

In this paper, we introduce the concept of infinitely split Nash equilibrium in repeated games in which the profile sets are chain-complete posets. Then by using a fixed point theorem on posets in [8], we prove an existence theorem. As an…

The concept of a classical player, corresponding to a classical random variable, is extended to include quantum random variables in the form of self adjoint operators on infinite dimensional Hilbert space. A quantum version of Von Neumann's…

Determining a Nash equilibrium in a $2$-player non-zero sum game is known to be PPAD-hard (Chen and Deng (2006), Chen, Deng and Teng (2009)). The problem, even when restricted to win-lose bimatrix games, remains PPAD-hard (Abbott, Kane and…

Modeling strategic conflict from a game theoretical perspective involves dealing with epistemic uncertainty. Payoff uncertainty models are typically restricted to simple probability models due to computational restrictions. Recent…

We consider a class of N-player stochastic games of multi-dimensional singular control, in which each player faces a minimization problem of monotone-follower type with submodular costs. We call these games "monotone-follower games". In a…

While fictitious play is guaranteed to converge to Nash equilibrium in certain game classes, such as two-player zero-sum games, it is not guaranteed to converge in non-zero-sum and multiplayer games. We show that fictitious play in fact…

Fitzpatrick's variational representation of maximal monotone operators is here extended to a class of pseudo-monotone operators in Banach spaces. On this basis, the initial-value problem associated with the first-order flow of such an…

This paper develops a unified framework for zero-sum games in which both the pure strategies and the payoff matrices contain complex-valued entries. By leveraging a linear isomorphism between complex and real vector spaces, we extend key…

We consider multi-agent decision making where each agent optimizes its convex cost function subject to individual and coupling constraints. The constraint sets are compact convex subsets of a Euclidean space. To learn Nash equilibria, we…

We consider a bilevel optimization problem having a single leader and multiple followers. The followers choose their strategies simultaneously, and are assumed to converge to a Nash equilibrium strategy profile. We begin by providing a…

For a number of important mean field games models, the Hamiltonian is non-local and not additively separable. This means that the distribution of agents appears in the Hamiltonian only in an integral over the whole spatial domain. For mean…

In this paper, we prove new existence and multiplicity results for critical points of lower semicontinuous functionals in Banach spaces, complementing the nonsmooth critical point theory set forth by Szulkin and avoiding the need of the…