相关论文: On local uniqueness of normalized Nash equilibria
This paper proposes a novel energy sharing mechanism for prosumers who can produce and consume. Different from most existing works, the role of individual prosumer as a seller or buyer in our model is endogenously determined. Several…
Previous work on convexity of neural codes has produced codes that are open-convex but not closed-convex -- or vice-versa. However, why a code is one but not the other, and how to detect such discrepancies are open questions. We tackle…
In this paper we consider continuity of the set of Nash equilibria and approximate Nash equilibria for parameterized games. For parameterized games with unique Nash equilibria, the continuity of this equilibrium mapping is well-known.…
In this paper, we study deterministic mean field games for agents who operate in a bounded domain. In this case, the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria cannot be deduced as for unrestricted state space because, for a large set of…
We investigate the complexity of bounding the uncertainty of graphical games, and we provide new insight into the intrinsic difficulty of computing Nash equilibria. In particular, we show that, if one adds very simple and natural additional…
In this paper we focus on noncooperative games with uncertain constraints coupling the agents' decisions. We consider a setting where bounded deviations of agents' decisions from the equilibrium are possible, and uncertain constraints are…
In this paper, we first provide a simple variational proof of the existence of Nash equilibrium in Hilbert spaces by using optimality conditions in convex minimization and Schauder's fixed-point theorem. Then applications of convex analysis…
We consider seeking generalized Nash equilibria (GNE) for noncooperative games with coupled nonlinear constraints over networks. We first revisit a well-known gradientplay dynamics from a passivity-based perspective, and address that the…
In this paper we propose two new monotonicity conditions that could serve as sufficient conditions for uniqueness of Nash equilibria in mean field games. In this study we aim for $unconditional\ uniqueness$ that is independent of the length…
Motivated by the randomized version of the classical Bolzano--Weierstrass theorem, in this paper we first introduce the notion of a random sequentially compact set in a random normed module and develop the related theory systematically.…
This work studies Nash equilibria for games where a mixture of coordinating and anti-coordinating agents, with possibly heterogeneous thresholds, coexist and interact through an all-to-all network. Whilst games with only coordinating or…
We establish the existence and sharp global regularity results ($C^{0, \gamma}$, $C^{0, 1}$ and $C^{1, \alpha}$ estimates) for a class of fully nonlinear elliptic PDEs with unbalanced variable degeneracy. In a precise way, the degeneracy…
The Nash Equilibrium is a much discussed, deceptively complex, method for the analysis of non-cooperative games. If one reads many of the commonly available definitions the description of the Nash Equilibrium is deceptively simple in…
We investigate complexity issues related to pure Nash equilibria of strategic games. We show that, even in very restrictive settings, determining whether a game has a pure Nash Equilibrium is NP-hard, while deciding whether a game has a…
We consider the problem of designing distribution rules to share "welfare" (cost or revenue) among individually strategic agents. There are many known distribution rules that guarantee the existence of a (pure) Nash equilibrium in this…
We study the repeated congestion game, in which multiple populations of players share resources, and make, at each iteration, a decentralized decision on which resources to utilize. We investigate the following question: given a model of…
Dynamic nonzero sum games are widely used to model multi agent decision making in control, economics, and related fields. Classical methods for computing Nash equilibria, especially in linear quadratic settings, rely on strong structural…
A bimatrix game $(A,B)$ is called a game of rank $k$ if the rank of the matrix $A+B$ is at most $k$. We consider the problem of enumerating the Nash equilibria in (non-degenerate) games of rank 1. In particular, we show that even for games…
We address the problem of assessing the robustness of the equilibria in uncertain, multi-agent games. Specifically, we focus on generalized Nash equilibrium problems in aggregative form subject to linear coupling constraints affected by…
We study markets of indivisible items in which price-based (Walrasian) equilibria often do not exist due to the discrete non-convex setting. Instead we consider Nash equilibria of the market viewed as a game, where players bid for items,…