相关论文: The Parameterized Complexity of Welfare Guarantees…
We study the problem of maximizing Nash social welfare, which is the geometric mean of agents' utilities, in two well-known models. The first model involves one-sided preferences, where a set of indivisible items is allocated among a group…
Given a connected graph on whose edges we can build roads to connect the nodes, a number of agents hold possibly different perspectives on which edges should be selected by assigning different edge weights. Our task is to build a minimum…
We study fair allocation of constrained resources, where a market designer optimizes overall welfare while maintaining group fairness. In many large-scale settings, utilities are not known in advance, but are instead observed after…
In this paper we study the hardness of the $k$-Center problem on inputs that model transportation networks. For the problem, a graph $G=(V,E)$ with edge lengths and an integer $k$ are given and a center set $C\subseteq V$ needs to be chosen…
In the simplest game-theoretic formulation of Schelling's model of segregation on graphs, agents of two different types each select their own vertex in a given graph so as to maximize the fraction of agents of their type in their occupied…
Optimizing communication topology is fundamental to the efficiency and effectiveness of Large Language Model (LLM)-based Multi-Agent Systems (MAS). While recent approaches utilize reinforcement learning to dynamically construct…
We study the problem of fair allocation of a set of indivisible items among agents with additive valuations, under matroid constraints and two generalizations: $p$-extendible system and independence system constraints. The objective is to…
We consider the problem of fairly dividing a set of heterogeneous divisible resources among agents with different preferences. We focus on the setting where the resources correspond to the edges of a connected graph, every agent must be…
Motivated by applications such as college admission and insurance rate determination, we propose an evaluation problem where the inputs are controlled by strategic individuals who can modify their features at a cost. A learner can only…
This study introduces GCO-HPIF, a general machine-learning-based framework to predict and explain the computational hardness of combinatorial optimization problems that can be represented on graphs. The framework consists of two stages. In…
We study the cake-cutting problem when agents have single-peaked preferences over the cake. We show that a recently proposed mechanism by Wang-Wu (2019) to obtain envy-free allocations can yield large welfare losses. Using a simplifying…
In a representative democracy, the electoral process involves partitioning geographical space into districts which each elect a single representative. These representatives craft and vote on legislation, incentivizing political parties to…
A set S of vertices of a graph is a defensive alliance if, for each element of S, the majority of its neighbors is in S. The problem of finding a defensive alliance of minimum size in a given graph is NP-hard and there are polynomial-time…
The classical house allocation problem involves assigning $n$ houses (or items) to $n$ agents according to their preferences. A key criterion in such problems is satisfying some fairness constraints such as envy-freeness. We consider a…
In this paper we study the problem of finding a small safe set $S$ in a graph $G$, i.e. a non-empty set of vertices such that no connected component of $G[S]$ is adjacent to a larger component in $G - S$. We enhance our understanding of the…
In recent work, Gourv\`es, Lesca, and Wilczynski propose a variant of the classic housing markets model where the matching between agents and objects evolves through Pareto-improving swaps between pairs of adjacent agents in a social…
We investigate the existence of fair and efficient allocations of indivisible chores to asymmetric agents who have unequal entitlements or weights. We consider the fairness notion of weighted envy-freeness up to one chore (wEF1) and the…
We consider the problem of maximizing the Nash social welfare when allocating a set $\mathcal{G}$ of indivisible goods to a set $\mathcal{N}$ of agents. We study instances, in which all agents have 2-value additive valuations: The value of…
In Defective Coloring we are given a graph $G = (V, E)$ and two integers $\chi_d, \Delta^*$ and are asked if we can partition $V$ into $\chi_d$ color classes, so that each class induces a graph of maximum degree $\Delta^*$. We investigate…
Motivated by real-world applications, we study the fair allocation of graphical resources, where the resources are the vertices in a graph. Upon receiving a set of resources, an agent's utility equals the weight of a maximum matching in the…