相关论文: The Parameterized Complexity of Welfare Guarantees…

We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods among a set of agents in a fair and efficient manner. An allocation is said to be fair if it is envy-free up to one good (EF1), which means that each agent prefers its own bundle…

We investigate a graph probing problem in which an agent has only an incomplete view $G' \subsetneq G$ of the network and wishes to explore the network with least effort. In each step, the agent selects a node $u$ in $G'$ to probe. After…

Partitioning a region into districts to favor a particular candidate or a party is commonly known as gerrymandering. In this paper, we investigate the gerrymandering problem in graph theoretic setting as proposed by Cohen-Zemach et al.…

Given a bipartite graph $G=(U\cup V,E)$, a left-perfect many-to-one matching is a subset $M \subseteq E$ such that each vertex in $U$ is incident with exactly one edge in $M$. If $U$ is partitioned into some groups, the matching is called…

Designing individualized allocation of treatments so as to maximize the equilibrium welfare of interacting agents has many policy-relevant applications. Focusing on sequential decision games of interacting agents, this paper develops a…

We investigate the parameterized complexity of the following edge coloring problem motivated by the problem of channel assignment in wireless networks. For an integer q>1 and a graph G, the goal is to find a coloring of the edges of G with…

In recent work by Bramoull\'{e} and Kranton, a model for the provision of public goods on a network was presented and relations between equilibria of such a game and properties of the network were established. This model was further…

This paper categorizes the parameterized complexity of the algorithmic problems Perfect Phylogeny and Triangulating Colored Graphs when parameterized by the number of genes and colors, respectively. We show that they are complete for the…

We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible items to agents with supermodular utilities to maximize the Nash social welfare. We show that the problem is NP-hard for any approximation factor.

We consider the problem of assigning tasks to agents under time conflicts, with applications also to frequency allocations in point-to-point wireless networks. In particular, we are given a set $V$ of $n$ agents, a set $E$ of $m$ tasks, and…

We study fair allocation of indivisible goods among agents. Prior research focuses on additive agent preferences, which leads to an impossibility when seeking truthfulness, fairness, and efficiency. We show that when agents have binary…

We introduce and analyze new envy-based fairness concepts for agents with weights that quantify their entitlements in the allocation of indivisible items. We propose two variants of weighted envy-freeness up to one item (WEF1): strong,…

Coordinating agents through hazardous environments, such as aid-delivering drones navigating conflict zones or field robots traversing deployment areas filled with obstacles, poses fundamental planning challenges. We introduce and analyze…

Over-generalization is a thorny issue in cognitive science, where people may become overly cautious due to past experiences. Agents in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) also have been found to suffer relative over-generalization…

We study fair division of indivisible goods in a single-parameter environment. In particular, we develop truthful social welfare maximizing mechanisms for fairly allocating indivisible goods. Our fairness guarantees are in terms of solution…

We explore solutions for fairly allocating indivisible items among agents assigned weights representing their entitlements. Our fairness goal is weighted-envy-freeness (WEF), where each agent deems their allocated portion relative to their…

We study fair and efficient allocation of divisible goods, in an online manner, among $n$ agents. The goods arrive online in a sequence of $T$ time periods. The agents' values for a good are revealed only after its arrival, and the online…

We study Matching and other related problems in a partial information setting where the agents' utilities for being matched to other agents are hidden and the mechanism only has access to ordinal preference information. Our model is…

We consider the problem of repeatedly choosing policies to maximize social welfare. Welfare is a weighted sum of private utility and public revenue. Earlier outcomes inform later policies. Utility is not observed, but indirectly inferred.…

Schelling games use a game-theoretic approach to study the phenomenon of residential segregation as originally modeled by Schelling. Inspired by the recent increase in the number of people and businesses preferring and promoting diversity,…