相关论文: Geometry of Dependency Equilibria

Extensive games are tools largely used in economics to describe decision processes ofa community of agents. In this paper we propose a formal presentation based on theproof assistant COQ which focuses mostly on infinite extensive games and…

There are only limited classes of multi-player stochastic games in which independent learning is guaranteed to converge to a Nash equilibrium. Markov potential games are a key example of such classes. Prior work has outlined sets of…

We present a unifying representation of computation as a two-player game between an \emph{Algorithm} and \emph{Nature}, grounded in domain theory and game theory. The Algorithm produces progressively refined approximations within a Scott…

We study a subclass of $n$-player stochastic games, namely, stochastic games with independent chains and unknown transition matrices. In this class of games, players control their own internal Markov chains whose transitions do not depend…

McLennan and Tourky (2010) showed that "imitation games" provide a new view of the computation of Nash equilibria of bimatrix games with the Lemke-Howson algorithm. In an imitation game, the payoff matrix of one of the players is the…

In this paper, I prove the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for a large class of games with nonconvex strategy spaces. Specifically, if each player's strategies form a compact, connected Euclidean neighborhood retract and if…

We investigate the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs for two person differential games. The main result of the paper is the characterization of the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs in the terms of nonsmooth analysis. Also we obtain the…

In the present work we deal with set-valued equilibrium problems for which we provide sufficient conditions for the existence of a solution. The conditions that we consider are imposed not on the whole domain, but rather on a self…

We investigate whether having a unique equilibrium (or a given number of equilibria) is robust to perturbation of the payoffs, both for Nash equilibrium and correlated equilibrium. We show that the set of n-player finite games with a unique…

We introduce a new methodology that enables detection of the onset of convergence towards Nash equilibria in simple repeated games with infinitely large strategy spaces, thereby revealing the heuristics used in decision-making. The method…

This paper presents a monoidal category whose morphisms are games (in the sense of game theory, not game semantics) and an associated diagrammatic language. The two basic operations of a monoidal category, namely categorical composition and…

We introduce a framework for stochastic games on large sparse graphs, covering continuous-time and discrete-time dynamic games as well as static games. Players are indexed by the vertices of simple, locally finite graphs, allowing both…

In the swap game (SG) selfish players, each of which is associated to a vertex, form a graph by edge swaps, i.e., a player changes its strategy by simultaneously removing an adjacent edge and forming a new edge (Alon et al., 2013). The cost…

This paper considers a formulation of a differential game with constrained dynamics, where one player selects the dynamics and the other selects the applicable cost. When the game is considered on a finite time horizon, its value satisfies…

We discuss similarities and differences between systems of interacting players maximizing their individual payoffs and particles minimizing their interaction energy. Long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics of spatial games with multiple…

We analyse the computational complexity of finding Nash equilibria in stochastic multiplayer games with $\omega$-regular objectives. While the existence of an equilibrium whose payoff falls into a certain interval may be undecidable, we…

The preferences of players in non-cooperative games represent their choice in the set of available options, which meet the completeness property if players are able to compare any pair of available options. In the existing literature, the…

The concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), introduced by Smith and Price, is a refinement of Nash equilibrium in 2-player symmetric games in order to explain counter-intuitive natural phenomena, whose existence is not…

We study stability in additively separable hedonic games when coalition sizes have to respect fixed size bounds. We consider four classic notions of stability based on single-agent deviations, namely, Nash stability, individual stability,…

In this article we compute analytically the number of Nash Equilibria (NE) for a two-choice game played on a (circular) ladder graph with $2n$ players. We consider a set of games with generic payoff parameters, with the only requirement…