相关论文: Two-Price Equilibrium

Market price systems constitute a well-understood class of mechanisms that under certain conditions provide effective decentralization of decision making with minimal communication overhead. In a market-oriented programming approach to…

General Equilibrium Theory is the benchmark of economics, especially its results concerning the efficient allocation of resources, known as the First and Second Welfare Theorems. Yet, General Equilibrium Theory is beyond the scope of most…

A number of goods are called identical if they provide the same level of utility to each agent. In various real-world instances of fair division scenarios, identical indivisible items are allocated to consumers and demandants with different…

Allocating items in a fair and economically efficient manner is a central problem in fair division. We study this problem for agents with additive preferences, when items are all goods or all chores, divisible or indivisible. The celebrated…

In an incomplete market the price of a claim f in general cannot be uniquely identified by no arbitrage arguments. However, the ``classical'' super replication price is a sensible indicator of the (maximum selling) value of the claim. When…

We consider a multiproduct monopoly pricing model. We provide sufficient conditions under which the optimal mechanism can be implemented via upgrade pricing -- a menu of product bundles that are nested in the strong set order. Our approach…

We obtain an exact necessary and sufficient condition for the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium asset prices in infinite horizon, discrete-time, arbitrage free environments. Through several applications we show how the condition…

The fair division of resources is an important age-old problem that has led to a rich body of literature. At the center of this literature lies the question of whether there exist fair mechanisms despite strategic behavior of the agents. A…

We initiate the study of multidimensional Bayesian utility maximization, focusing on the unit-demand setting where values are i.i.d. across both items and buyers. The seminal result of Hartline and Roughgarden '08 studies simple,…

The literature on the Price of Anarchy (PoA) of simple auctions employs a no-overbidding assumption but has completely overlooked the no-underbidding phenomenon, which is evident in empirical studies on variants of the second price auction.…

We consider the problem of fairly allocating items to a set of individuals, when the items are arriving online. A central solution concept in fair allocation is competitive equilibrium: every individual is endowed with a budget of faux…

Much work has been done on the computation of market equilibria. However due to strategic play by buyers, it is not clear whether these are actually observed in the market. Motivated by the observation that a buyer may derive a better…

We introduce a model of fair division with market values, where indivisible goods must be partitioned among agents with (additive) subjective valuations, and each good additionally has a market value. The market valuation can be viewed as a…

The distribution of wealth among the members of a society is herein assumed to result from two fundamental mechanisms, trade and investment. An empirical distribution of wealth shows an abrupt change between the low-medium range, that may…

We study resource allocation in two-sided markets from a fundamental perspective and introduce a general modeling and algorithmic framework to effectively incorporate the complex and multidimensional aspects of fairness. Our main technical…

We described a method to solve deterministic and stochastic Walras equilibrium models based on associating with the given problem a bifunction whose maxinf-points turn out to be equilibrium points. The numerical procedure relies on an…

Model inadequacy and measurement uncertainty are two of the most confounding aspects of inference and prediction in quantitative sciences. The process of scientific inference (the inverse problem) and prediction (the forward problem)…

We study a networked economic system composed of $n$ producers supplying a single homogeneous good to a number of geographically separated markets and of a centralized authority, called the market maker. Producers compete \`a la Cournot, by…

In this paper, we consider a future electricity market consisting of aggregated energy prosumers, who are equipped with local wind power plants (WPPs) to support (part of) their energy demands and can also trade energy with day-ahead market…

We consider the problem of unfair discrimination between two groups and propose a pre-processing method to achieve fairness. Corrective methods like statistical parity usually lead to bad accuracy and do not really achieve fairness in…