相关论文: Two-Price Equilibrium

We study welfare analysis for policy changes when supply and demand behavior are only partially known. We augment the robust approach pioneered by Kang and Vasserman (2025) by incorporating the supply side. We posit intervals of feasible…

Consider a seller with m heterogeneous items for sale to a single additive buyer whose values for the items are arbitrarily correlated. It was previously shown that, in such settings, distributions exist for which the seller's optimal…

Price of anarchy, the performance ratio, which could characterize the loss of efficiency of the distributed supply chain management compared with the integrated supply chain management is discussed by utilizing newsvendor problem in single…

A general information equilibrium model in the case of ideal information transfer is defined and then used to derive the relationship between supply (information destination) and demand (information source) with the price as the detector of…

We formulate an equilibrium model of intraday trading in electricity markets. Agents face balancing constraints between their customers consumption plus intraday sales and their production plus intraday purchases. They have continuously…

This paper proposes a simple descriptive model of discrete-time double auction markets for divisible assets. As in the classical models of exchange economies, we consider a finite set of agents described by their initial endowments and…

In this work we consider selling items using a sequential first price auction mechanism. We generalize the assumption of conservative bidding to extensive form games (henceforth optimistic conservative bidding), and show that for both…

We study the problem of fair allocation of a set of indivisible items among agents with additive valuations, under matroid constraints and two generalizations: $p$-extendible system and independence system constraints. The objective is to…

Value alignment has emerged in recent years as a basic principle to produce beneficial and mindful Artificial Intelligence systems. It mainly states that autonomous entities should behave in a way that is aligned with our human values. In…

We initiate the study of statistical inference and A/B testing for first-price pacing equilibria (FPPE). The FPPE model captures the dynamics resulting from large-scale first-price auction markets where buyers use pacing-based budget…

We study approximation algorithms for revenue maximization based on static item pricing, where a seller chooses prices for various goods in the market, and then the buyers purchase utility-maximizing bundles at these given prices. We…

We introduce a new class of combinatorial markets in which agents have covering constraints over resources required and are interested in delay minimization. Our market model is applicable to several settings including scheduling, cloud…

We study the relationship between two central concepts in the allocation of divisible goods: competitive equilibrium (CE) and allocations that maximize Nash welfare, i.e., allocations where the weighted geometric mean of the utilities is…

We study social welfare in one-sided matching markets where the goal is to efficiently allocate n items to n agents that each have a complete, private preference list and a unit demand over the items. Our focus is on allocation mechanisms…

In a seminal paper, McAfee (1992) presented the first dominant strategy truthful mechanism for double auction. His mechanism attains nearly optimal gain-from-trade when the market is sufficiently large. However, his mechanism may leave…

This paper proposes an alternative to the classical price-adjustment mechanism (called "t\^{a}tonnement" after Walras) that is second-order in time. The proposed mechanism, an analogue to the damped harmonic oscillator, provides a dynamic…

Classic results show that even an arbitrarily small correlation across bidders' information can enable full surplus extraction in auctions and related mechanism design settings. Motivated by this fragility, we study the information…

Selling a single item to $n$ self-interested buyers is a fundamental problem in economics, where the two objectives typically considered are welfare maximization and revenue maximization. Since the optimal mechanisms are often impractical…

Many-to-one matching markets exist in numerous different forms, such as college admissions, matching medical interns to hospitals for residencies, assigning housing to college students, and the classic firms and workers market. In all these…

This paper is merged with arXiv:2107.08965v2. We refer the reader to the full and updated version. We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods among agents with 2-value additive valuations. Our goal is to find an…