相关论文: Knowledge-Based Stable Roommates Problem: A Real-W…

We study stable matchings that are robust to preference changes in the two-sided stable matching setting of Gale and Shapley [GS62]. Given two instances $A$ and $B$ on the same set of agents, a matching is said to be robust if it is stable…

We study a fair resource sharing problem, where a set of resources are to be shared among a group of agents. Each agent demands one resource and each resource can serve a limited number of agents. An agent cares about what resource they get…

In this paper, we investigate stable matching in structured networks. Consider case of matching in social networks where candidates are not fully connected. A candidate on one side of the market gets acquaintance with which one on the…

We consider transferable-utility profit-sharing games that arise from settings in which agents need to jointly choose one of several alternatives, and may use transfers to redistribute the welfare generated by the chosen alternative. One…

We thoroughly study a generalized version of the classic Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates problems where agents may share partners. We consider two prominent stability concepts: ordinal stability [Aharoni and Fleiner, Journal of…

Thick two-sided matching platforms, such as the room-rental market, face the challenge of showing relevant objects to users to reduce search costs. Many platforms use ranking algorithms to determine the order in which alternatives are shown…

We tackle the problem of partitioning players into groups of fixed size, such as allocating eligible students to shared dormitory rooms. Each student submits preferences over the other individual students. We study several settings, which…

We consider the problem of computing popular matchings in a bipartite graph G = (R U H, E) where R and H denote a set of residents and a set of hospitals respectively. Each hospital h has a positive capacity denoting the number of residents…

The past few years have seen a surge of work on fairness in allocation problems where items must be fairly divided among agents having individual preferences. In comparison, fairness in settings with preferences on both sides, that is,…

In many labor markets, workers and firms are connected via affiliative relationships. A management consulting firm wishes to both accept the best new workers but also place its current affiliated workers at strong firms. Similarly, a…

In the stable marriage problem (SM), a mechanism that always outputs a stable matching is called a stable mechanism. One of the well-known stable mechanisms is the man-oriented Gale-Shapley algorithm (MGS). MGS has a good property that it…

Stability is crucial in matching markets, yet in many real-world settings - from hospital residency allocations to roommate assignments - full stability is either impossible to achieve or can come at the cost of leaving many agents…

We consider methods for aggregating preferences that are based on the resolution of discrete optimization problems. The preferences are represented by arbitrary binary relations (possibly weighted) or incomplete paired comparison matrices.…

We introduce a new algorithm for finding stable matchings in multi-sided matching markets. Our setting is motivated by a PhD market of students, advisors, and co-advisors, and can be generalized to supply chain networks viewed as $n$-sided…

We study a practical centralized matching problem which assigns children to daycare centers. The collective preferences of siblings from the same family introduce complementarities, which can lead to the absence of stable matchings, as…

Large-scale, two-sided matching platforms must find market outcomes that align with user preferences while simultaneously learning these preferences from data. Classical notions of stability (Gale and Shapley, 1962; Shapley and Shubik,…

The study of stable matchings usually relies on the assumption that agents' preferences over the opposite side are complete and known. In many real markets, however, preferences might be uncertain and revealed only through costly…

A major limitation of existing routing algorithms for multi-agent systems is that they are designed without considering the potential presence of adversarial agents in the decision-making loop, which could lead to severe performance…

We propose an $O(n^2)$-time algorithm to determine whether a given matching is efficient in the roommates problem.

This study investigates the problem of individualizing treatment allocations using stated preferences for treatments. If individuals know in advance how the assignment will be individualized based on their stated preferences, they may state…